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ABSTRACT
Crisis Manager of the American Revolution: Henry Laurens
Jeffrey R Gudzune

As President of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens was a firm leader amid
a time of national emergency. When a dispute within the Continental Army threatened
both the continuation of General Washington’s command and the American alliance with
France, Laurens went beyond his limited sphere of political authority to settle the matter.
When a peace commission from England arrived in the United States to begin discussing
terms for an end to the hostilities, Laurens found himself in an increasingly difficult
diplomatic situation. While wrestling with the question of whether or not to accept the
British offer, Laurens was also forced to hold the tenuous union of thirteen sovereign
states together amid internal disputes, some of which had spilled over into the national
government. Throughout his term, Laurens stood out as an advocate for national
unification against the British and contributed an essential service to the American
Revolution.
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Introduction
Henry Laurens did not seek a revolution, nor did he ask to be made President of
the Continental Congress in 1777. However, he was elected to the post and helped turn
the tide of the American Revolution. When all seemed lost, when the Continental Army
was out of funds and fracturing into personal and political chaos, when Congress itself
seemed on the verge of atrophy, he took action when action was most needed. At this
time, he emerged as a capable leader and crisis manager. Though a stranger to the
Continental Congress, Laurens distinguished himself as America’s most powerful
advocate during the financial and interpersonal conflicts that faced the young
confederation throughout the year 1777. Henry Laurens was effective as a political
leader, diplomat, and crisis manager during one of the most crucial years of the American
Revolution, 1777-1778.
Henry Laurens’ contribution to the cause of American independence cannot be
underestimated. As President of the Continental Congress, Laurens led the American
Confederation from November of 1777 until his resignation in December of 1778. He
guided the agenda of the Continental Congress and served as a conduit through which
their deliberations reached the fledging nation. Though he was wary of the dangers
inherent in a war with Great Britain, Henry Laurens embraced the task to which he was
elected. His most significant contribution to the American Revolution was to stand
behind General George Washington amid a controversy which grew from a dispute
between Washington and General Thomas Conway. What began as a personal conflict
between two generals soon grew to threaten the stability of the Continental Army and
posed a danger to the alliance with France. Laurens advocated unity within the Congress
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at a time when delegations were drifting away from their national responsibilities. To
deal with these and other problems during his term in office, Laurens drew on the
experiences garnered in his early life in the mercantile industry, as well as his political
background in the affairs of South Carolina.
While Henry Laurens’ service to the cause of independence is well documented,
few historians have gone into detail regarding his political impact while serving as
president of the Continental Congress or his later activities. The literature surrounding
Laurens and his life do not do justice to the full effect that the man had on the American
Revolution. In many books on the subject he is mentioned only in passing. Authors like
John Ferling and Joseph Ellis mention Laurens as president of the Continental Congress
and then as a prisoner in the Tower of London, but they stop short of outlining his
contributions. The main biography of Henry Laurens, David Duncan Wallace’s The Life
of Henry Laurens (New York: Russell and Russell, 1915), provides the most vivid detail
about the man and his motivations during one of the most tumultuous years of the
American Revolution. In this now dated monograph, the author portrays a man of
unquestionable abilities, but neglects a detailed account of his actions. While Wallace
provides a thorough historical timeline he neglects the overall effect of Laurens’ political
decisions. The evidence is presented in Wallace’s argument, but fails to draw the
necessary conclusions based on Laurens’ actions.
Gregory Massey’s John Laurens and the American Revolution (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2000) looks at Henry Laurens and his relationship
with his oldest son. While this book serves as a biography of the younger Laurens, it also
includes insight into Henry Laurens and the effect of his political decisions on his
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personal life. The decisions that shaped Laurens’ political legacy during his tenure as
president of Congress were made only after careful reflection on the issues at hand. He
did not easily arrive at these decisions as they concerned the future of a new nation.
Scholarship regarding Henry Laurens usually presents him as a mediator in the
debates of the Continental Congress. His job was to chair the meetings of Congress, and
nothing else. As an executive, his authority was ill defined. He most certainly did not
possess the vast authority that George Washington would have when he became the first
President under the Constitution of the United States. However, Laurens’ private and
public correspondence indicates that he was far more than a chairman--he was an active
leader who took his responsibilities seriously.
Using these sources, it is easy to examine the political development of Henry
Laurens from South Carolina merchant into an active proponent of the American
Revolution. He did not begin his service to the national government as a committed
proponent of revolution. However, as British taxation began to affect his life, Laurens
began to change his opinions. To fully understand the man and his motivations it is
necessary to examine his early life in South Carolina and the events that surrounded his
conversion. This analysis will be a political biography exploring Henry Laurens in the
roles of political leader, crisis manager, and diplomat. It is evident from a detailed
exploration of his personal and political correspondence that Henry Laurens gradually
evolved into a revolutionary figure. There is no example of a specific event that caused
his change in thought. Like his evolution into a prosperous merchant, Henry Laurens
became a supporter of the American cause only after a series of events corrected the
course of his development.
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Chapter One: An Extraordinary Man
Henry Laurens was born in Charles Town, South Carolina on March 6, 1724 to
John and Esther Laurens. John Laurens was a prosperous saddler, who had built a
successful business that generated a comfortable living for him and his family. His
business efforts were so profitable that he was able to retire while still a relatively young
man and devote the remainder of his life to public service as a church warden and fire
master for Charles Town.1
When Henry reached the age of twenty, he was dispatched to London to begin
learning the merchant trade under James Crokatt, a man who had already achieved a great
deal of success before transferring his business to London from South Carolina. Laurens
learned the intricacies of the mercantile industry under a most apt tutor. Henry excelled
in a field where it is essential for an individual to not only be a capable accountant, but a
skilled organizer. During his apprenticeship, Henry traveled widely with Crokatt’s
shipments and communicated their safe arrival to his mentor. The business contacts he
made were integral to his success in later years.2
Expectations do not always yield a positive result, as young Henry Laurens would
find out after serving under Crokatt for three years. It was his hope and indeed his
expectation to achieve a partnership with his mentor. Having both learned the details of
the merchant trade and provided valuable service to Crokatt, Laurens felt that he was the
perfect man for the task.3 However, no such partnership materialized and Laurens

1

David Duncan Wallace, The Life of Henry Laurens. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1915), 13.
Wallace, 15-16.
3
Henry Laurens to James Crokatt, July 14, 1747, The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume One: September
11, 1746-October 31, 1755. Philip M Hamer, ed. 2 vols. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1968), 1: 28-29. Though Laurens would not openly aggrandize himself in front of his mentor, his service
and dedication prove his desire to attain the partnership.
2
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returned to South Carolina in 1747, unsure of his future. Arriving in Charles Town,
Henry learned that his father had died no more than four days before his ship arrived in
port. This news devastated the young man, who was now thrust into the arduous task of
serving as executor of his late father’s will. Around this same time, several letters arrived
from London outlining the long anticipated partnership between Henry Laurens and
James Crokatt--the good news coincided with the most devastating event of his young
life.4
Writing to James Crokatt, Laurens confessed that he was “under great concern
for” the loss of his father and lamented the fact that he had been unable to communicate
with Crokatt.5 Working to fulfill his commitment to Crokatt while at the same time
seeing that his father’s will was properly executed proved to be a task that drained him
emotionally as well as physically. In a letter to Richard Grubb, a partner to James
Crokatt, Laurens said that since he was entrusted with the task of settling his father’s
affairs, he had “scarcely the time to attend my own.”6 In a subsequent letter to Crokatt,
Laurens confessed that he was exhausted from his endeavors, yet he was aware of his
obligation to perform all his duties. This is the first glimpse at Henry Laurens the task
master, a quality he would continue to possess throughout his life and one that would
become essential in his service during the American Revolution.7
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HL to James Crokatt, June 3, 1747, Papers. Hamer, 1:3.
Ibid, 1:3. Laurens was writing his mentor in regard to his lack of communication concerning the
shipments which he accompanied to South Carolina. Not only was he responsible for assuring their safe
arrival, but he was also vested with the task of distributing them to the various markets and securing
payment. This was a difficult time for the young man, having not only to cope with the loss of his father,
but the added stress of competing in the market economy.
6
HL to Richard Grubb, June 23, 1747, Papers. Hamer, 1:8. In this letter, the first evidence of strain is
visible as Henry Laurens comments on how he has fallen behind in the execution of his other
responsibilities--namely his duties to Crokatt and his personal life.
7
HL to James Crokatt, June 24, 1747, Papers. Hamer, 1:9-10. This was not the last time Laurens
performed multiple tasks.
5
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Laurens hoped to have his father’s estate settled so he could be in London by late
April, 1748. In his letters, Laurens refers to “the old scheme,” or partnership, with
Crokatt.8 However, his pressing duties as executor of his father’s estate forced him to
twice delay his departure from South Carolina. As a means of gaining revenue and to
keep up with the demands of the merchant industry, Laurens established a small store in
Charles Town. This business allowed him to remain in contact with prominent South
Carolina merchants and prepared him to assume the desired partnership with Crokatt.
Though Crokatt granted Laurens an extension to his April deadline, the former apprentice
was unable to leave Charles Town until September 28, 1748. In London, a series of
unfortunate miscommunications and accusations of malfeasance made by Crokatt
towards Laurens forever destroyed any chance of a business relationship.9
After his futile trip to London, Henry returned to South Carolina in 1749 and
established a partnership with George Austin--it would soon prove to be a more
fortuitous turn of events.10 His return to South Carolina was the beginning of many
business and public associations that would lead him to an active role in the politics of his
colony.
The firm of Austin and Laurens was successful. They exported corn, rice, millet
and indigo to British markets in London and throughout England, and then used the
profits from these sales to import items into the colonial market. South Carolina was in
the midst of a booming economy as a result of trade with Great Britain and her
8

HL to Alexander Watson, August 25, 1747, Papers. Hamer, 1:48.
HL to Elizabeth Laurens, December 16, 1748, Papers. Hamer, 1: 179. Laurens was accused of not
honoring his previous commitment to Crokatt. However, he insisted that he acted in good faith.
10
HL to Foster Cunliffe, January 20, 1749, Papers. Hamer, 1: 203. It is altogether fortunate that Laurens
returned to South Carolina when he did and resolved to enter into a business relationship with Mr. Austin.
Having already made numerous contacts throughout coastal North America, and having established himself
in Charles Town, Laurens was now putting himself into a position of great importance.
9
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dominions.11 Though the British Navigation Acts demanded that the majority of the
export items went to the homeland, some goods were also sold to the more northern
colonies of America and to the West Indies. According to David Wallace, South
Carolina was rapidly growing into an economic powerhouse in the mid eighteenth
century. A new generation of independently wealthy merchants and planters was taking
hold in the colony, and Henry Laurens was one of the leaders of South Carolina society.
Failure of the British to properly enforce the Navigation Acts allowed colonial merchants
to increase their profits.12
By the end of their first year in business, Austin and Laurens had established a
successful import-export business. The major import items were sugar, stationary, food
products, beer, and clothing.13 By 1751, the firm imported indentured servants and black
slaves, and advertising their services to the Charles Town community. Laurens became a
major player in the slave trade, an evil that had become necessary as South Carolina
expanded its export industry, which was based on its plantation industry. Laurens grew
wealthy from the slave trade and other importers sought his advice. Though he would
one day lament his involvement, he made his fortune in the slave trade.14 His business
efforts made Henry Laurens one of the richest men of South Carolina.
While Laurens was a member of a successful partnership, he frequently made his
own investments and side agreements with his fellow merchants, as he had done while
apprenticed to James Crokatt. He sold rum, beer, animals skins, even imported marble

11
12
13
14

HL to Richard Farr, February, 18, 1749, Papers. Hamer, 1:212.
Wallace, 26-27.
Advertisement, October 2, 1749, Papers. Hamer, 1:240.
Advertisement, October 23, 1751, Papers. Hamer, 1:242.
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facades for fireplaces to personal friends.15 To say that Henry Laurens was a busy man
would not begin to describe the effort with which he embraced his responsibilities as a
merchant. Laurens was involved in every aspect of his profession, accounting, recordkeeping, communication, and networking with other merchants. He traveled throughout
Britain in search of the goods to import to South Carolina. He did this not only while
engaged in business for the firm of Austin and Laurens, but for his own private ventures.
From his business records, it is clear that Laurens knew the location of every shipment
and remained in constant communication with the ports receiving his merchandise.16
Despite the complicated method through which items from one continent were
purchased by merchants on another, a long and involved process that relied on payments
sent through several intermediaries, Henry Laurens settled his accounts on time.17 This
demonstrates the keen organizational skills requisite in a member of the merchant class,
skills that Henry Laurens possessed and employed with vigor throughout his career.
These skills became equally important in the decades to follow as Laurens confronted the
task of building a nation out of thirteen sovereignties.
Despite the strenuous pace with which he embraced his business efforts, Laurens
began a family. On June 25, 1750, Henry Laurens married Eleanor Ball.18 With his
business success, Laurens moved into a new social strata--one that coincided with South
Carolina’s rise to economic prominence. South Carolina society endeavored to copy that
of London. The wealthy planter elite and the merchant class had, in a generation, risen to

15
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17
18

Wallace, 47.
HL to William Whaley, May 12, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:245.
HL to John White, May 22, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:251.
Record of Marriage, June 25, 1750, Papers. Hamer, 1:241.

9

the status of their counterparts in Britain, or so they believed.19 A new world was on the
rise in the colonies, especially within South Carolina. Henry Laurens was a part of a
rising generation of successful, wealthy merchants whose involvement in the public life
of the colony sustained that new world.
Having made a comfortable living for himself, Henry Laurens now turned to
public service. He was elected to the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina in
September of 1757. The legislative body of South Carolina enjoyed a rich history of
achieving its political goals over the royal governor, the crown’s representative. The
legislators acted independently of the will of the crown and dedicated their energies to
sustaining the market economy of the colony.20 This was in part due to what Jack P.
Greene refers to as “a marked correlation between” the rise in the colonial elite, most
notably the merchants, and the rise in legislative authority. In The Quest for Power,
Greene notes that the colonial legislatures attained the upper hand with the royal
governors due to a combination of economic and political factors. In South Carolina, it
was the independent will of the legislators, who gradually gained more control over
economic factors without strong opposition from the royal administration.21
This was the world that Henry Laurens entered when he assumed the duties of his
office. South Carolina was separated from Great Britain by an ocean but linked to it by a
very British ideology of legislative self determination and trade. Furthermore, having to
protect itself from territorial incursion from Indians gave South Carolina the opportunity

19

Jack P Greene, The Quest for Powers, the Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies:
1689-1776. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 5.
20
Ibid, 9.
21
Ibid, 11-12.
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to develop both financially and politically.22 South Carolina needed a strong defense
against the Cherokee, whose territories bordered the colony. With the resumption of
hostilities between Great Britain and France during the Seven Years’ War, this was a
priority. The Cherokee were a major power in the area. South Carolina’s periodic
encroachments into their territories made them more willing to ally themselves with
France.23
Though peace had been maintained between South Carolina and the Cherokee due
to previous negotiations directly with the British government, incursions by the colonists
created a rift.24 Finally, in 1761, with threat following counter-threat, South Carolina was
prepared to invade the Cherokee, augmented by a force of British troops sent by General
Jeffrey Amherst. Henry Laurens saw the dangers of an extended conflict with the
Cherokee. South Carolina did not posses the manpower to successfully defend itself
from invasion and protracted warfare. Such a conflict would have a negative impact on
the entire colonial economy.25
Even before his election to Commons, Laurens expressed his views on the rising
conflict with France. After hearing rumors of the defeat and rout of Major General
Edward Braddock’s forces near present day Pittsburgh in 1755, Laurens confessed to
Walter Caddell that “such an event [another war with France] would disconcert all our
schemes in North America.” In this, he was referring to the continued existence of the

22

Greene, 298-300.
Greene, 310-311.
24
Wallace, 98-100. Several Cherokee chiefs had negotiated an agreement with the British government in
1730, which did not specify a border between the two sides. With the natural population growth that
accompanies a healthy economy, South Carolina began to expand into Cherokee territory. Naturally,
tensions rose and a conflict between the colonial troops and Cherokee warriors undermined the peace
efforts.
25
Wallace, 101.
23
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colonies and South Carolina’s market economy. Laurens, like any other businessman,
was concerned not only with his colony but with the effect that a war would have on his
business.26
To provide a strong defense, Laurens realized a more cohesive militia unit was
necessary. Writing to James Cowles in August of 1755, Laurens commented that
General Braddock’s regular forces would have attained a larger degree of success had
they pursued the war with colonial militia units as the primary body of troops.27 In fact,
he continued to uphold this belief in subsequent correspondence. Writing to business
associates in England, Laurens again warned that allowing the French forces to advance
down the Ohio and Mississippi valleys threatened the security of the colonists and the
economy of North America.28 In truth, colonial militia units were a part of General
Braddock’s army in 1775. However, conflicts between colonial militias and British
regulars prevented a cohesive military unit from being formed. These problems were an
extension of the intrinsic political conflicts between the colonial assemblies and the
British government over the funding of the war effort. As a legislator, Laurens was
aware of the problems but did not perceive them to be an aggravating factor.29
In his letter to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, Laurens advocated a colonial union.
“Were the several provinces to unite in their strength,” he argued, ”we should be able to
do anything.” There were other leaders throughout North America who felt this way, but
Laurens warned that due to the diverse natures of the various colonial governments, no
such coalition would be plausible until “an apparent danger of the whole shall drive them
26
27
28
29

HL to Walter Caddell, August 15, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:319.
HL to James Cowles, August 20, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:321.
HL to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, August 20, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:321.
Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763.
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to the necessity of it.”30 In fact, such an idea had been discussed and rejected by the
colonies in 1754. Meeting in Albany, New York, the colonies had unanimously rejected
a plan of union proposed by Pennsylvania’s Benjamin Franklin and Massachusetts
Governor William Shirley.31 Experiencing a great deal of frustration at the way the
British government was pursuing the war, and concerned with the future of his colony’s
economy, Laurens continued to voice his opinions on how the war should be prosecuted.
As fate would have it, his election to the Commons House in 1757 allowed Laurens to
publicly express his feelings on the war.
It was during his service in the colonial legislature that Henry Laurens became a
fierce advocate for a stronger defense of South Carolina’s borders. Distrustful of what
the Cherokee might do in the event of French overtures, Laurens felt the necessity of
securing the border and preparing for the worst. Seeing that the public treasury was taxed
to its limits, Laurens and other successful South Carolina merchants agreed to contribute
funds to the war effort, an action that was widely noted and lauded at the time.32
Throwing his energies into providing South Carolina with a strong defense, Henry
Laurens was appointed a lieutenant colonel in the colonial militia on September 16, 1760.
His commission, signed by Lieutenant Governor William Bull, charged him with the task
of organizing a unit of one thousand soldiers. This unit was to be raised to defend South
Carolina against a potential invasion by the Cherokee nation.33 Though he was re-elected
to the Commons in 1760, he was unable to take his seat as he was preoccupied with his
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986.), 164-165.
30
HL to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, August 20, 1755, Papers. Hamer, 1:321-322.
31
Joseph L. Davis, Sectionalism in American Politics: 1774-1787. (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1977), 12.
32
Public Subscription, November 17, 1759, The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume Three: January 1,
1759-August 31, 1763. Philip M Hamer, ed. 2 vols. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1972), 3:16.
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military duties.34 South Carolina’s Gazette credits Laurens with being the most
successful militia recruiter within the colony.35 Another report indicates that Laurens
made efforts to recruit soldiers from North Carolina as well and that he met with the
Catawba ruler, King Haigler.36 The purpose of this meeting was to gain assurances from
the Catawba ruler that the colonists could count on their support against the French. King
Haigler assured Laurens that his people would maintain peaceful relations with the
British and that they would not be swayed by French overtures. This was enough to
mollify Laurens and the meeting was reported in the Gazette as “a good talk.”37
Eventually, drawing from both North and South Carolina, Henry Laurens created a
militia unit of twelve hundred able men to serve as a buffer.38
The militia unit, sponsored and recruited by Laurens, engaged in prolonged
warfare with the Cherokee during the year 1761. Though Laurens was not an active
participant in the actual battles with the Cherokee, he did accompany the militia to
reconnoiter through their territory and was vested with the responsibility of safeguarding
close to one thousand sick and wounded soldiers. In a letter to Reverend John Ettwein,
Laurens describes how the colonial militia marched “for the middle settlements of the
Cherokee Nation, holding the olive branch in one hand and the [word missing] of cruel
war in the other, leaving the choice to be made by the people who dwelt there.”39
33

Commission as Lieutenant Colonel, September 16, 1760, Papers. Hamer, 3:46.
Appendix listing of Henry Laurens and his actions in the Commons House, Papers. Hamer, 3:561. This
session of the House began in October of 1760 and ended in February of 1761. The house journal lists
Laurens as being re-elected to his seat, but requesting leave to pursue his militia activities. Among his
many duties, Laurens was also vested with the task of finding funds for the newly established militia unit.
35
Newspaper Accounts, October 26, 1760, Papers. Hamer, 3:52-53. There are several accounts from the
Gazette included in this collection of Henry Laurens’ papers. For the most part, the newspaper articles
indicate his degree of success while recruiting for the South Carolina militia.
36
Newspaper Accounts, February 7, 1761, Papers. Hamer, 3:59.
37
Ibid, 3:34.
38
Wallace, 101.
39
HL to John Ettwein, July 17, 1761, Papers. Hamer, 3:73-74.
34
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The Cherokee apparently chose war. Perhaps because of the cruelty with which
the colonial militia eventually subdued the Cherokee, the colony of South Carolina was
secure in her borders for the duration of the Seven Years’ War.40 When the Cherokee
nation was forced to sue for peace, Laurens was one of the members of the Commons
House who escorted the delegation to the temporary capital of South Carolina, Shem
Town. The Commons was forced to relocate to the northwest due to an outbreak of
yellow fever in Charles Town.41 With little choice, given the destruction brought to their
settlements, the Cherokee agreed to the terms set forth by the colony. Attakullakulla, one
of the principal chiefs of the Cherokee Nation, agreed to accept the partition of some of
his lands to establish a border with South Carolina.42
With the 1763 end of the Seven Years’ War, Laurens was able to devote more
time to his profitable business efforts and return to his seat in the Commons. It was
during this time, 1763 until 1775, that the Commons enhanced its power and finally
asserted its independence from the crown. The Commons had always exerted its will
over the royal administration by insisting that it had the right to appoint revenue
collectors and control the public funds used to pay crown appointed officials, including
the royal governor’s salary.43 Disputes over the appointment of judges and the right of
the legislature to issue money further aggravated the situation.44

40

Wallace, 102. In June of 1761, a regiment under the command of Colonel James Grant pushed deep into
Cherokee territory and conducted a scorched earth policy against the towns and villages that they
encountered. This campaign is said to have lasted thirty days and inflicted great damage to the Cherokee
nation.
41
Preliminary Negotiations with the Cherokee, September 10-22, 1761, Papers. Hamer, 3: 83. Laurens is
mentioned as the person responsible for delivering the records of the preliminary negotiations conducted in
the field with the Cherokee leader, Attakullakulla, to Lieutenant Governor Bull and the Commons House.
42
Wallace, 102.
43
Greene, 358.
44
Ibid, 402-403.
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Such quarrels were not new to South Carolina politics, and the Commons had
usually attained the upper hand--a fact which Laurens noted quite frequently. Even as
early as 1747, Henry Laurens was aware of the distrust with which the people of South
Carolina viewed the colonial administration. “The people of the Province are generally
very fickle,” he wrote to Reverend Richard St. John in November of 1747, “…especially
in respect to Governors Spiritual or Temporal, soon pleased and soon disgusted.”45
Though he wrote this letter to his friend in confidence, Laurens was aware that the
interest of colonists and crown representatives often diverged. As the people became
more and more dissatisfied with British authority, the Commons House in South Carolina
gained importance.
As a result of the prolonged war with France, Great Britain found itself in an
increasingly difficult financial situation. King George III referred to the Seven Years’
War as a “bloody and expensive” conflict. Though the British were victorious and the
American colonies secured, the king forced the resignations of the spendthrift ministers
who had prosecuted the war and caused a debt of over 130 million pounds. What
followed would bring even more tension between the colonies and the British
government.46
As a result of a prosperous trade with Great Britain, the American colonies had
enjoyed a great degree of economic success. This trade was guided by the Navigation
Acts, a series of laws governing the shipping industry. Though the Navigation Acts were
originally created to bolster the English shipping industry as it faced Dutch competition,

45
46

HL to Richard St. John, November 11, 1747, Papers. Hamer, 1:80.
Wallace, 410.
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they provided a secure system of exchange between the territories of Great Britain.47 The
acts were meant to assure that certain export items from the colonies were shipped on
English vessels, by English crews, and only to English ports.48 Colonial merchants were
required to attain bonds and certificates attesting that the vessels they were using were
English and that their destinations were ports in possession of the British empire. In the
years before the Seven Years‘ War, the British government allowed the colonies to
engage in an indirect trade with one another. This lead to a period of economic
expansion that allowed the colonies to prosper.49
By 1763, the period of unchecked economic and political development had
become widely noticed within the British empire. Oliver Dickerson describes an
America on the rise, benefiting from trade with Great Britain and growing into thirteen
independent political entities.50 Meanwhile, England was recovering from the financial
effects of another war with France. Dickerson describes the series of legislation that
followed as a reorganization of colonial America.51 Government ministers and British
merchants had seen the rapid political development that had accompanied colonial
expansion as an affront to the power of the Parliament to regulate trade, and thereby
govern the colonies.52
In 1764, the British Parliament passed the Sugar Act, which required a duty of
three pence to be paid on items imported from French or Dutch merchants. Included in

47

Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution. (New York: Octagon Books,
1978), 31-32.
48
Ibid, 64.
49
Ibid, 64.
50
Ibid, 149.
51
Ibid, 172.
52
Ibid, 273.
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the list of taxable commodities were molasses, coffee, and sugar.53 Violators of this act
would be subject to prosecution in Vice-Admiralty courts.54 In 1765, the Parliament
adopted the Stamp Act, which required a tax to be paid on all legal documents, playing
cards, newspapers, and dice.55 Vice-Admiralty courts began to enforce the Navigation
Acts on colonial merchants who, in the past, had sidestepped English regulations. It was
customary for merchants sending goods from one colony to another to attain a bond to
assure that their goods would be shipped according to the Navigation Acts. Henry
Laurens always attained the required bonds.56
The Stamp Act caused more of an uproar throughout the American colonies than
had the previous Sugar Act. In South Carolina, Henry Laurens was confronted with a
crisis of conscience regarding the Stamp Act. While he recognized that the legislation
threatened the economy of South Carolina, he did not advocate the public upheaval that it
caused. He was right to be concerned, as a series of riots and public demonstrations
against the bill spread throughout Charles Town in October of 1765. Tax collectors were
hanged in effigy, bitter diatribes were directed at the royal governor, and the city entered
a period of paranoia over the implementation of this most unpopular legislation.57
Though Henry Laurens was not a party to the collection of taxes through the
Stamp Act, he was nonetheless a victim of the misdirected rage of his fellow colonists.
On October 23, 1765, Laurens was confronted by an unruly mob of colonists who
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believed that he was holding the stamp seals sent from Great Britain. Startled awake in
the early hours of the morning, Laurens confronted the assembled colonists. To make
matters worse, Eleanor Laurens was eight months pregnant and quite ill.58 Laurens later
commented that he knew several of the individuals who were demanding entrance to his
home, despite their disguises.59 The mob insisted that Laurens was in possession of the
offending stamp paper and resolved to search his house--an action he would not consent
to, vowing to seek satisfaction with any who dared cross his threshold. While the
accusations of those angry colonists were untrue, Laurens was still forced to mollify the
crowd.60
Having justified his position by pointing to his own public statements against the
Stamp Act, Laurens insisted that the crowd disperse.61 This incident represents the
paranoia that spread throughout the citizenry of South Carolina as legislation from Britain
began to have a more visible impact on colonial society. While Henry Laurens also
viewed this action as an encroachment of the long enjoyed liberties of the colonists, he
did not condone violent street action. What occurred at the Laurens’ residence was
hardly an isolated incident. Throughout the American colonies, there were similar riots
and assaults on tax collectors. The tide of discontent washed over the citizens of the
thirteen colonies.62 In October of 1765, a conference of colonial representatives was
called by the Massachusetts legislature for the express purpose of discussing the
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situation. Nine of the thirteen colonies sent representatives to the Stamp Act Congress,
which met in New York City.63 While Laurens was not in favor of the Stamp Act, he
could not support the creation of such an extra-legal body. He furthermore refused to
sign the resolves of South Carolina’s Committee of Correspondence, which updated her
agents in London as to the situation in the colonies.64
In New York City, the Stamp Act Congress drafted a series of resolutions
outlining their position against the legislation.65 After the repeal of the Stamp Act in
1766, a new series of problems came to light along with a new colonial resolve. Laurens
foresaw these problems when he received word of Parliament’s decision that it “had a
right to Tax the Colonies.”66
The Declaratory Acts of 1766, passed the same day that Parliament repealed the
Stamp Act, asserted the authority of Parliament over the colonial governments.67 The
Townshend Acts, adopted in 1767, imposed a duty on various imports for the purpose of
paying the salaries of royal officials in the colonies. Riots and demonstrations filled the
streets of America’s major cities, as civil unrest and political dissent became a concerted
public outcry. Writing to Lachlan McIntosh, Laurens commented that his colony would
“not subscribe to the right of a British Parliament to lay internal taxes upon America.”
He concluded that South Carolina, like all the other colonies, would “sullenly and
stubbornly resist against all ministerial mandates and admonitions tendering to enslave
them.”68 In 1768, the South Carolina Commons and Governor Charles Greville Montagu
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clashed over the legality of Parliament’s decision to legislate for the colonies. When the
governor dissolved the house in November, the legislative discontent continued when it
reconvened in August. At its inaugural meeting, the Commons adopted a plan of nonimportation of British goods in protest of the Townshend Acts--similar agreements were
made by other colonies throughout the year.69 During the next two years, Laurens
demonstrated a dedication to the non-importation agreement, claiming it was a lawful
assertion of colonial rights.70
At this time, Laurens himself became a victim of the Navigation Acts. Several of
Laurens’ shipments were stopped at their ports and his vessel, the Wambaw, was seized at
Charles Town harbor. Although, Laurens had purchased the bond required by law and
forwarded it to the appropriate customs official, his vessel was still held at port. Laurens
was forced to pay court costs for his efforts to set the situation right, a common
occurrence in both the Carolinas.71
Other prominent merchants experienced similar treatment, with shipments
detained by royal customs officials. Despite a series of protests to the ministry sent to
South Carolina’s colonial agent in London, Charles Garth, the British government did
nothing to rectify the situation. Tensions rose and Laurens was challenged to a duel by
customs collector Daniel Moore, who had held his ships at port. Moore avoided the
appointment and fled to Georgia; he was relieved of his position in 1769.72 There were
other conflicts between royal officials and merchants in South Carolina from 1763 to
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1776--widening the rift between the royal government and the colonists.73
Manifestos and bitter diatribes were exchanged between the colonial assemblies
and the crown appointed administrators throughout the remainder of the 1760s. Attitudes
were changing as a result of British policy. Merchants and political leaders of the colony
became dissatisfied with their status within the empire. This issue pushed South Carolina
and other colonies towards independence. A coastal market economy in which the
independent merchants reigned now found itself subject to the dictates of royal
appointees. This was not acceptable for South Carolina and most certainly not for men
like Henry Laurens.74
Another shake up in the British government found one Prime Minster being
ushered out the door while another was stepping up to take charge. In March of 1770,
Lord North repealed all of the duties imposed by the Townshend Acts, except for the one
on the importation of tea.75 Though Henry Laurens had always advised caution when it
came to confronting the British government, he was also an avid proponent of local
government and he considered the Townshend duties an affront to South Carolina’s
legislative independence.76 While the American colonies were British territories, and the
colonists British subjects, they were also a part of a new cultural identity that was taking
shape.77 In Becoming America, Jon Butler discusses the rise of this new identity as being
part of a gradual process. As a result of the combination of various nationalities, and the
isolation from Great Britain itself, society in the thirteen colonies had been reshaped into
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something different from that of the British. The colonies developed their own
economies, their own political traditions, and their own cultural identity.78
Cautious in his approach to anything resembling separation, Laurens warned of
possible dangers. He disapproved of rioting and acts of violence, favoring discourse and
diplomacy as the only ways to achieve a desired end. He supported the colonies in the
adoption of the non-importation act in 1768, a legal protest to the taxation of items such
as tea, glass, and paper.79 However, the repeal of all the Townshend duties, save the one
on tea, did not improve the situation in the colonies.80 Laurens approved of nonimportation, despite personal financial loss, until the colony of South Carolina abandoned
the plan in December of 1770. However, it is clear from his writings that the act had an
impact on his standard of living. “I am not worth so many pounds, shillings, and pence
as you knew me worth in April, 1764,” he wrote to George Appleby in September of
1769. During the non-importation agreement, Laurens survived by selling the crops
grown at his home, Mepkin Plantation; but his import business was seriously effected.81
Nonetheless, Henry Laurens endured.82
As the situation in the colonies grew worse, Laurens elected to dedicate his
energies to achieving from Great Britain a more conciliatory policy towards North
America. In letters to business associates in London, as well as to South Carolina’s
colonial agent, Laurens warned of the ever increasing dangers of suppressing American
autonomy. While he never espoused independence, he did fully embrace the concept of
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America as a self-governing entity within Great Britain. This was not a new concept, nor
was it a construct wholly of South Carolina, but was a rapidly growing belief among
many colonists.83
The tense situation within the thirteen colonies and the death of his wife, Eleanor,
in 1770 gave impetus to Laurens’ decision to relocate to England. In 1771, Henry
Laurens took up residence in London to see to the education of two of his sons, John and
James. His time in London gave him the opportunity to evolve personally as well as
politically and alter some of his views on the state of affairs between the colonies and
Great Britain.84
Laurens found that the academic institutions in London did not provide the
education that he wished his sons to have. He therefore sent John and James to a school
in Geneva, Switzerland, where science and mathematics were stressed and moral virtues
were rigidly enforced. This, he felt, would provide his sons with a well rounded
education and prepare them for life in a civilized society.85 Laurens lauded the studious
nature of the Swiss instructors, whom he saw as paragons of virtue. It was only after the
boys had completed their schooling in Switzerland that Laurens resolved to further their
education in England. By this time, his ten year old son, also named Henry, had joined
them.86
Though he was re-elected to the Commons in 1772, he was unable to return from
England and would most likely have declined the offer had the royal governor not once
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more dissolved the house.87 Laurens continued to advocate colonial rights to members of
Parliament and observed the political situation in Great Britain.88 Returning to South
Carolina in November of 1774, Laurens was subsequently elected to the First Provincial
Congress, which was established to enforce the non-importation of tea from Great
Britain.89 By the summer of 1774, a general call for representatives expanded this body
into an assembly of over one-hundred colonists. After redistricting and agreeing on a
parliamentary format, the organization became a legislature in January of 1775. Though
they were not quite ready to supplant the royal administration, the colonial
representatives present were preparing to assert their long upheld belief of selfdetermination.
In a letter to his son, John, Laurens asks the student’s counsel regarding the
colonial determination “to make a firm and steady opposition to the measures adopted by
administration for enslaving us and our property.”90 Laurens referred to the creation of
the First Continental Congress and its assertion that the colonists alone could legislate for
the individual colonies. This was not only a bold move by the colonists, but was treason
in the eyes of any loyal Englishman. The congress, however, invoked English law in this
assertion and claimed that as part of that canon, the “people have a right to participate in
their legislative council.”91 With the petition by the congress to the people of Great
Britain, Laurens soon saw that the situation would not quickly mend itself.
With the decision of the First Continental Congress to adopt measures that barred
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the importation of British goods, and the widening gap between the mother country and
the colonies, Laurens feared not only for his homeland but for businesses.92 The next
stage of Laurens’ political evolution began in 1775, as he moved toward revolution.
With all the colonies suffering “violations of faith and credit” and being “unjustly treated
by the mother country,” Laurens was uncertain over which path to take. He confesses his
feelings to a friend living in London, hoping “that the wisdom of your new Parliament
will deliver us from the deplorable state to which we are reduced by the folly of their
predecessors.”93
Though the Provincial Congress of South Carolina styled itself the legislature of
the colony, there was no legal basis for such a claim. This body nonetheless operated as
a government body, even providing for representatives to be dispatched to the Second
Continental Congress. Though Laurens was wary of the dangers of any military conflict
with Great Britain, he nonetheless stood up for the rights he believed that colonies
possessed--the most sacred of these, the right to self-determination of economic and
political affairs.94 As each day brought more news of the rising tide of dissent within the
colonies, South Carolina moved nearer to chaos. The Provincial Congress gradually took
over the powers presumably exercised by the Commons House. This was the revolution
as it started in South Carolina, with a new legislature at the head of an emerging state.95
In a letter to his son, John, Laurens bewailed the course his colony was taking and
confessed that he wept for the circumstances that provoked the leaders of his colony to
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choose such a course. “I feel for the distress of my country,” he wrote, “I weep for the
horrid effects of civil discord which must soon be produced if we proceed in our contest
with Great Britain.”96 His letters throughout the year 1775 reflect his concern over the
rise of dissent among the colonists, the landing of British troops on North American soil,
and even the potential for armed conflict.97
As the fledgling revolutionary government of South Carolina grew, Henry
Laurens continued to serve as a more moderate voice in the affairs of state, yet always
insisting that the colonies had the right to legislate for themselves. When the Provincial
Congress ordained a Council of Safety in June of 1775, to provide leadership for the
colony during its recess, Henry Laurens was elected president. At the inaugural meeting
of this body, regulations for the governing of the colonial militia were established and a
general treasury was created to provide funds to operate the government.98 Like his
contemporaries in the business elite, Henry Laurens wished to avoid war and seek out
political reconciliation. Indeed, these were the thoughts that he expressed to his business
associates in London as well as to his most trusted confidante, his son, John.
This was not a new concept, nor was it considered altogether foolish given the
circumstances surrounding the rebellion in North America. Aside from the obvious fears
that such a war aroused, namely thirteen colonies battling what was considered to be the
greatest empire in the world, there were also economic considerations. The colonies had
benefited from their relationship with Great Britain and had, for the most part, enjoyed a
lengthy period of economic prosperity. Consequently, a war with the mother country
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would shut down the harbor towns of South Carolina, which were the life blood of the
colony’s economy.99 Laurens and other members of South Carolina’s merchant class felt
this sting as 1775 drew to its close.
As president of the Council of Safety, Laurens oversaw the raising of troops for
the protection of South Carolina and the dispersal of funds to provide for the arming and
clothing of those troops.100 With the beginning of the Second Provincial Congress on
November 1 of 1775, Laurens remained active in the legislative affairs of his colony,
serving on several important finance committees. When the first session of the Second
Provincial Congress adjourned on November 29, 1775, the government of the colony was
once more left to the Council of Safety. Council president Henry Laurens continued his
defensive preparations.101 During this time, British vessels were expelled from the
harbors of South Carolina and a series of fortifications were built for the purposes of
defense. Revolution had begun and the rift between the colony and the mother country
was widening.102
Throughout the final months of 1775, Laurens and the Council of Safety were
engaged in preparing for war with Great Britain. The colonists erected forts, raised
militia units, and dispersed funds to support the defense of the state. The situation was
grave as Laurens warned of the eminent arrival of British warships.103 To make his
burden worse, Laurens received word that his son, James, had died suddenly in London
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in September of 1775.104 Grieved, he was forced to bear this sorrow as well as the mantle
of leadership. As loyalist regiments prepared to battle the colonists, South Carolina
exchanged its provincial status for a new designation--independent state. The machinery
of war had been prepared and though Laurens feared the result, he endeavored to defend
his charge.105
When the Second Provincial Congress reconvened in February of 1776, it quickly
took up the duties of government for the colony. The body was aided in this endeavor by
the absence of Governor Lord William Campbell, who had fled to the newly arrived
warship Cherokee in Charles Town harbor over fears of a popular uprising. The Council
of Safety had made adequate defensive preparations during the recess, while at the same
time entreating Lord William to return and make peace with the colonists. In a letter
addressed to the governor, Laurens requested Campbell return to the capital, provided he
“take no active part against the good people of this colony.”106 Having no interference
from the royal administration, the Provincial Congress moved to solidify the break with
the mother country. After intense debate over the powers and functions of the entities of
statehood, the congress “metamorphosed in the twinkling of an eye into a General
Assembly, from whence a President and Commander-in-Chief, Vice-president and Privy
Council, a Legislative Council and divers officers of state have been chosen by ballot.”107
Despite his best efforts to prevent this, Laurens was elected to the post of Vice-
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president of the newly styled state of South Carolina. “I went so far yesterday,” he
confessed to his son, John, “as to retire from the House under this declaration that I
would not serve, whether another has been chosen I know not.”108 After the adoption of
the South Carolina constitution, Laurens continued to maintain hope that the grievances
between Great Britain and the mother country would be resolved.109 Laurens did not
advocate revolution; seeing the dangers of such a contest, he still entertained hopes for a
reconciliation with the mother country. When he received word of the adoption of the
Declaration of Independence by the Continental Congress, he lamented that the action
was made necessary.110
Henry Laurens was not born a revolutionary. He was a product of the era in
which he lived. As a merchant, he felt his livelihood endangered by the incursions of the
British Parliament. As a political leader in South Carolina, he viewed the assertion of
Parliamentary power over the colonies as an infringement of American rights. Laurens
did not start out as an advocate of separation, in fact he preferred reconciliation over
absolute independence. In his thinking, the colonies already possessed the right to
legislate for themselves. As an integral part of the British empire, the colonies of North
America were a new frontier. In the mind of men like Henry Laurens, the British
Parliament’s decision to impose taxes on the colonies represented a gross abuse of
legislative authority. As the door was closed on the issue of reconciliation, Laurens
moved into the next stage of his public evolution.
On January 10, 1777, Henry Laurens collided with his destiny and began the most
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challenging endeavor of his public life. “I am ordered to the Congress of the United
States,” he wrote to John Laurens in February of 1777, “I said it would be impossible for
me with any propriety to leave this place before the month of May, the vote was
confirmed, I call it therefore as I feel it, a Command--I go.” Elected as one of South
Carolina’s delegates to the Second Continental Congress, Laurens grudgingly accepted
this “command” and set his affairs in order for the journey to Philadelphia.111 His
previous experience and service to the public had conspired to prepare him for the task
that awaited him. However, in the months to come he would face his most difficult
challenge of all--sustaining a new nation.
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Chapter Two: A Harsh Winter
Henry Laurens viewed his election to the Continental Congress as an arduous
“command” that must be obeyed despite the personal sacrifice involved. Eleanor Ball
Laurens had died in 1770, leaving Henry Laurens a widower. With the death of James
and having to see to the education of John Laurens, Henry Laurens was pulled in several
directions. His personal concerns were heightened by business problems caused by the
conflict with Great Britain. Military concerns added to Laurens’ cares as he strove to
secure South Carolina’s borders. It is understandable that he viewed his election to the
Congress with dread. Moreover, a series of troubling events were beginning to threaten
the stability of the American Confederation, not to mention the war effort. Lack of
supplies and financial deficiencies, compounded with a serious dispute over the future of
General Washington’s command, endangered the success of the American cause. In
Congress, Laurens overcame his personal concerns to provide the firm leadership that
America needed to overcome this and other crises.
Arriving in Philadelphia on July 21, 1777, Laurens quickly learned of the
approaching danger posed by British forces. “We are assured from good authority that
this city is the object of the campaign,” he wrote to John Lewis Gervais in reference to
the reports of General Sir William Howe’s movements toward the capital.112 In this same
letter, Laurens discusses the need for alliances with European nations. Thinking of the
future of the country, Laurens realized that the states would need financial as well as
military assistance from nations such as France, Spain, and the German states.113 Indeed,
his actions throughout the coming year were motivated by his concern for the financial
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strain placed on the general government by the war with Great Britain.
The necessity of negotiating an alliance with France gave Laurens the most
concern. The two major issues faced by Laurens in the early months of his presidency
threatened that alliance. As a result of the machinations of Silas Deane, who had been
appointed by the congress to assist Benjamin Franklin in France, Philadelphia was
overrun by French nobles seeking commissions in the Continental Army. Deane had
promised several influential nobles commissions as a means of gaining support from the
French government.114 While Laurens agreed that worthy French officers might assist the
Continental Army, he did not approve of Deane’s actions because it placed Congress in
an awkward position. As Laurens explained in his letter to John Lewis Gervais, “if we
employ [the Frenchmen] with all his unwarranted contracts, many of our best generals
will be grossly affronted.” However, Laurens realized that if congress refused to
accommodate these individuals, the potential for an alliance with France could be put in
grave jeopardy.115
When it became apparent that the Continental Congress could not accommodate
every request, angry letters from distraught commission seekers were sent to
Philadelphia. This discontent led Laurens to consider the potential for “disparaging
reports of Congress at the Court of France,” which would negatively affect the French
view of the United States. Laurens confessed that the proper course of action would be to
remove Silas Deane from his position as a Commissioner to France and replace him with
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another representative.116
Laurens did understand the importance of advancing some worthy foreign
individuals such as the Marquis de Lafayette, whom Laurens felt was a dedicated patriot.
In the next few months his interaction with the Marquis developed into a personal
friendship.117
Three weeks into his congressional service, Laurens noticed a serious deficiency
in the way in which the Continental Congress managed the affairs of the nation. With
conflicting reports from General Washington of the disposition of British forces further
complicating the situation, Laurens began to express his concerns over the future of the
American Revolution. New York was occupied by the British under General Sir William
Howe, its harbor blockaded by warships under the command of Admiral Richard Howe.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, General George Washington, was
trapped in New Jersey and in desperate need of money.118 Knowing that General Howe
had advanced towards Philadelphia, the Continental Congress began to make a
contingency plan should the seat of government be occupied.119 “Congress in the present
situation of affairs think it necessary to prepare for adjourning to Lancaster,” Laurens
wrote to George Galphin in September of 1777, “…perhaps before sun rise tomorrow, I
shall be on my journey.”120
As a precautionary measure, several members of the Continental Congress left the
city. “We keep enough to make a Congress, and that’s all,” Laurens wrote to John Lewis
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Gervais, “I shall remain as long as any--I sent my baggage forward some days ago and
can easily transport myself.”121 While the simple majority that remained in the capital
began to debate “the weighty business of confederation,” Laurens kept one eye on his
flight and the other on the duties at hand.122 When it became apparent that General Howe
and his forces were close to Philadelphia, Laurens was one of the last members of the
Continental Congress to vacate the city.123
After his arrival in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the seat of government for the exiled
Continental Congress, Laurens appraised the leadership of his state of the situation. In a
letter to John Lewis Gervais, Laurens describes his calm withdrawal from Philadelphia,
along with many of the town’s patriot residents. “Thousands of all sorts in all
appearances past by in such haste,” he wrote, “that very few could be prevailed on to
answer to the simple question, what news?” “I, however, would not fly,” he concluded,
“I stayed breakfast and did not proceed till 8 o’clock.”
While exiting the city, Laurens happened by the wounded Marquis de Lafayette,
who had been struck by a British musket ball during the battle of Bristol. Laurens’
respect for the young Marquis’ leadership abilities and courage increased after this
meeting. He safely deposited the young French soldier in the city of Bethlehem before
joining the rest of the Congress at Lancaster on September 27, 1777.124
Laurens began communicating with the Marquis after learning of his swift
recovery from his wounds, informing the Frenchman that his belongings and
correspondence were being sent to him in the field. Praising his actions in the recent
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battle, and lauding him for his swift recovery, Laurens made efforts to develop a cordial
relationship with Lafayette. This action was motivated by his personal interest in the
young man, but it also worked to cement relationships between France and the United
States. Lafayette’s support and considerable wealth were important factors in
maintaining a positive relationship.125
After realizing that Lancaster would not support the departments of the
government, the Congress elected to set up a capital in the city of York, Pennsylvania.
On September 27, 1777, the Continental Congress resolved “that the Treasury Board
direct the treasurer, with all his papers, forms, etcetera to repair to the town of York.”126
Moving the various records and personnel proved difficult but altogether necessary. It
was at York that the Continental Congress lost one of its oldest proponents, and would
gain one of its most dedicated leaders. John Hancock resigned as President of the
Continental Congress on October 31, 1777, leaving vacant the post he had occupied for
over two years. The congressional record for that day gives no intimation as to why the
president would relinquish his duties. The record only states that Hancock stated that he
had served in the capacity long enough.127 On November 1, 1777, Delegate Henry
Laurens was elected to fill this void. As an outsider in national affairs, Laurens was not
an outspoken member of the Continental Congress. He therefore did not have the time to
take a stance on issues that divided the national legislature. Subsequently, he did not
make enemies within the government. His efforts to maintain neutrality on issues of
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concern made him the perfect candidate to lead the Congress.128
The duties of the office of President of the Continental Congress were enough to
weaken the strongest revolutionary. It was a thoroughly exhausting, constantly thankless
position that brought with it the burden of a new nation’s survival. It is understandable
that Henry Laurens voted against his own nomination and tried to refuse the office when
it was conferred upon him.129 The path that Laurens had been compelled to take was a
rocky one and before his term was up he not only redefined his position, he corrected the
course of government for the United States of America.
Perhaps it was the realization of the enormity of the task before him that
compelled Henry Laurens to vote against his own nomination to succeed John
Hancock.130 The duties of the President of the Continental Congress were more than one
person could sufficiently deal with. Though his scope of authority was undefined, Henry
Laurens was to serve as the conduit through which the decisions of the Continental
Congress reached the struggling young nation.
In his first letter to the states, President Laurens apprised the governments of the
United States that despite the removal of the Congress to York, the war was not lost. In
fact, a significant victory had been scored during the hasty removal of the government
from Philadelphia. In October of 1777, British forces under General John Burgoyne had
been defeated by American forces under Major General Horatio Gates in the battle of
Saratoga, New York. When news of this victory reached the Congress, a day of
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thanksgiving was proclaimed. “The arms of the United States of America having been
blessed in the present campaign with remarkable success,” he wrote, “Congress have
resolved to recommend that one day, Thursday the 18th December next be set apart and
observed by all the inhabitants throughout these States for a General Thanksgiving.”131
The first message contained hope for an American victory and solemn prayers for
deliverance from the specter of war.
Aside from communicating with the individual state governments, Laurens was
also vested with the responsibility of updating the Commander-in-Chief of the
Continental Army of the progress of congressional policies. Almost immediately after
assuming the chair of the congress, Laurens received letters from General Washington
complaining of a lack of funds and a severe need of clothing for the Continental Army.132
The general also informed the new president that it would be beneficial to the American
cause to have the Marquis de Lafayette in service as a Major General of Continental
forces with his own command.133 At the same time, Laurens was apprised of the
conditions of General Burgoyne’s surrender to Major General Horatio Gates. Lieutenant
Colonel John Laurens sent a hand written copy of the negotiations and the final
settlement to his father on November 5, 1777. General Burgoyne agreed to Gates’ terms
and his men were allowed to leave the battle site with their arms under the proviso that
they not serve in North America again.134
Laurens wasted no time in responding and immediately reported this important
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military success to the Continental Congress.135 There was little time to enjoy this news,
however. On November 11, 1777, General Washington reiterated his requests for more
money and more clothing for the Continental Army.136 In response to Washington’s
letter, Laurens informed the general that the Treasury was severely depleted and therefore
it would take time to send the necessary funds. Aside from the cost of moving the
Congress several times and the money it had already expended supplying the army, there
were other reasons for the near bankrupt status of the Continental Treasury.
In a letter to John Lewis Gervais, Laurens commented that the congress had, as a
matter of protocol, given “sums to these disappointed speculatists who had been induced
to cross the Atlantic from hearing that there was ’a fine war’ in this side.” In this,
Laurens referred to the foreign officers and nobles, most of whom were French, who had
been enticed by Silas Deane to seek commissions in the Continental Army.137 Congress
had resolved to pay these French officers enough money to cover their travel expenses
back to France or to territories within the French sphere of influence. The resolution of
the congress agreed to compensate these individuals “according to their respective
stations.”138
Frustrated at not being able to effectively assist General Washington, Laurens
began to worry about the state of affairs for the new national government. However,
referring Washington’s request for additional clothing directly to the Board of War,
Laurens sought a speedy solution. When the board determined that the best course of
action would be to seek out private merchants to supply the army, Laurens immediately
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sent orders to Boston for that purpose with the approval of Congress.139 This is the first
instance in which Henry Laurens stepped beyond the limited scope of political authority.
Although he had no executive authority, occupying the presidency allowed
Laurens to “move” Congress towards certain actions.140 Directing the agenda of the
Congress permitted Laurens to submit the most important requests directly to the
appropriate boards. Sidestepping official congressional protocol seemed the best course
of action, allowing important requests to be evaluated by the appropriate boards.
When other military figures pressed congress for funds, President Laurens went
directly to the chairman of the treasury board and enquired as to the status of the
continental treasury. He also advised the members of congress to seek other funding
sources within their respective states to assist with the pressing financial crisis.141 To
lessen the financial burden faced by the Congress, it was resolved that all measures be
employed to secure such items as blankets and shoes.142
To confront the problem of supplying the Continental Army, Laurens and the
Congress wrote directly to the individual states to seek out their assistance. Laurens
informed the Clothier General of the Continental Army, James Mease, that orders from
Congress had been sent to Boston authorizing the purchase of shoes and clothing for
10,000 soldiers. In this letter, Laurens commented that though the orders of the Congress
only mentioned Boston as a source of supplies, that Mease should also make such
arrangements with Salem and Newberry Port. Laurens further commented that he had
sent letters to the Massachusetts Assembly outlining his request, as well as the orders of
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the congress. Although the orders from the Continental Congress did not include the
towns of Newberry and Salem, Laurens commented, “I am sure it was so intended.”
Knowing of several prominent merchants within these towns who supported the cause
gave the president a marked advantage over some of his congressional colleagues who
were not in trade.143 Perhaps these additional locations were overlooked by the Board of
War and by the Congress. However, it was Laurens who recognized the importance of
deviating from the exact wording of the congressional dispatch and took the appropriate
steps.
While he was adhering to the dictates of the Congress, Laurens used his own
methods. He was not reluctant to express his own sentiments in correspondence as seen
in many of his letters to the state governments and to General Washington and the
Marquis de Lafayette. When James Mease later pressed Laurens for more money to
purchase additional supplies, Laurens sidestepped the congressional protocol that
required him to submit this request through the treasury board and went directly to the
Congress. The request was immediately taken up at the president’s insistence and passed
by the congress.144
When Congress resolved to seek military supplies through its commissioners in
Europe, Laurens contributed his own opinions to the debates, speaking not only as a
delegate but as the president of the Congress. The resolution of congress only outlined
the purchase of gun powder and lead from European markets. However the president felt
that it would be best to seek out “three or more proper persons, skillful in working lead
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mines and refining lead ore.”145 Though he did not serve on the Committee for Foreign
Affairs, he nonetheless added his own sentiments to their original resolution and
presented his findings to the congress.
Henry Laurens, dedicated to the cause of American independence, stepped
beyond the limited scope of his political authority, making valuable contributions to the
resolutions of the Continental Congress. However, the voluminous correspondence that
was required for his position afforded him little time to rest. Another example of this
came shortly after he assumed the presidency. In November of 1777, Colonel Benjamin
Flower, Commissary General of Military Stores, informed Laurens of a serious
deficiency in the procedures of congress in relation to the war effort. The colonel alerted
the president that several dozen important commissary positions had not been filled,
despite his continued insistence. Laurens immediately went to the floor with these
concerns. The resolution providing for these commissions had been passed by the
congress in September of 1777. However, due to the confusion that had accompanied the
evacuation from Philadelphia, no action had been taken. Bringing the Commissary
General’s letter directly to the congress, the president urged an immediate response. The
commissions were filled and Laurens sent an immediate response to Colonel Flower.146
On November 30, 1777, President Laurens wrote to Lieutenant Colonel John
Laurens that “the last 48 hours, have been almost wholly employed at this table and in
Congress.” “In that time,” Laurens continued, “I have had about 7 hours sleep.” Less
than one month into his new position, Laurens was overwhelmed. The information that
was made available to him began to weigh heavily on his mind. As the President of
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Congress, Laurens was privy to reports from all departments of the war. One report from
General Washington warned of the possibility of General Howe taking the city of York
and seizing the entire government. Although this report was never verified, and proved
to be idle speculation, such fears existed and gave the president several sleepless nights.147
In this same letter, Laurens lamented the deplorable state of the Continental
Congress and the severe lack of ready funds to supply the army. After a thorough
investigation, Laurens discovered that the biggest problem resulted from the many
commissions promised by Silas Deane to foreign officers during his time in Paris. It was
no wonder that the Continental Congress could not keep the army supplied, when it had
already bestowed “money out by millions to particular persons” to satisfy these
promises.148 Recognizing that congress could not continue to support the hordes of
French soldiers who were now entreating congress for their promised commissions,
Laurens sent letters to the states requesting funds and supplies for the Continental Army
as a means of lessening the burden faced by the general government. Laurens also
entreated the states to find places for these men within their militia units. Again, not
wishing to alienate the French and lose the possibility of an alliance with France, Laurens
sought a means to placate these individuals.149
All of these factors led Henry Laurens to worry about the future of America. His
strenuous efforts to keep up with the volume of correspondence between the congress and
the state governments weakened his health and he was stricken with a severe case of gout
in December of 1777.150 Though he never doubted that the American cause would
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succeed, he feared the ravages of the winter to come and the state of affairs of the general
government in York.
Another concern that Laurens faced was the rise in profiteering among merchants
within the United States and the sluggish nature of the individual state governments in
responding to such actions. When goods purchased in Massachusetts by the Continental
Congress through Deputy Clothier General Samuel Otis were not delivered, Laurens and
the congress took immediate action.151 In a letter to the Massachusetts Assembly,
Laurens voiced the “inexpressible concern” of the government towards these merchants
who had refused to accept the credit of the Continental Congress. Laurens, though
speaking for the general government, added his own sentiments and passionate
expression to this letter in an effort to arouse a sense of duty to the cause in the members
of the assembly. “If the several governments do not speedily exert their authority to
effectually suppress such unheard of extortion,” he stated, condemning the merchants
who did not fulfill their contractual obligations, “it will unquestionably issue, and at no
very distant period too, in the destruction of the liberties of this continent.”152
Another important task that Henry Laurens was vested with was maintaining the
positive relationship between the Continental Congress and the foreign officers in service
to the United States. In this, Henry Laurens the diplomat comes into prominence. The
most important ally, of course, was France. Aside from informing General Washington
and the regional commanders of the Continental Army of the disposition of supplies and
money, Laurens also sent letters to Lafayette outlining the government’s progress. To
ensure the safe arrival of his correspondence, Laurens informed the Marquis that he
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always sent out six copies of his letters during war, a habit that he suggested that the
Marquis adopt when communicating with his contacts in France.153
In a letter dated December 20, 1777, Laurens informed Lafayette that John Adams
had been appointed one of the American Commissioners to the court of France and asked
the Marquis to introduce Adams, “to the countenance of your noble friends in France.”
Laurens realized Adams could make vital political and financial contacts within the
French nobility so he acted independently of the Continental Congress.154 Relying on his
friendship with the Marquis helped Laurens to achieve otherwise unattainable ends.
Another aspect of his position allowed Laurens to underscore resolutions made by
the Continental Congress with respect to the individual states. Though much of what was
transmitted to the state governments was included in official dispatches, Laurens sent
personal letters to the leadership of the states pointing out important information in these
dispatches. Some of these acts of congress were only briefly discussed in the official
dispatches, yet were promoted by Laurens as priorities for the consideration of the state
legislatures. Most of the resolutions that Laurens underscored as priorities dealt with
supplies and money for the Continental Army.155
To say that Laurens was a dedicated public servant does not begin to describe the
diligence with which he embraced his responsibilities. Despite the deleterious effect that
the presidency had on his health, Laurens worked constantly to communicate the desires
of Congress to the state governments and the commanders of the Continental Army.
Writing late into the night and at the earliest light of the morning, Laurens stressed the
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importance of each state’s participation in the American cause. Despite the pain of his
affliction Laurens did not wish to miss the appointed meetings of the congress. He
therefore resolved to be carried into sessions when walking proved difficult.156
What concerned Laurens most was the fact that General Washington’s forces had
recently entered their winter quarters. With the ravages of winter, it became increasingly
necessary to seek out new sources of supplies and clothing for the troops. “Had proper
diligence been used,” he wrote in reference to the sluggish nature through which congress
had originally responded, “those who are now naked and perishing in General
Washington‘s camp might have all been covered in November.”157 His frustrations
reached a fevered pitch when winter ravaged the Continental troops encamped at Valley
Forge, Pennsylvania. Throughout the country, Continental troops were settling into their
winter quarters. From assuming the presidency in November until January of 1778,
Laurens received dispatches outlining a shocking lack of supplies and money from New
York, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
Writing to Rhode Island Governor Nicholas Cooke, Laurens commented that
since Congress had made no response to Cooke’s request for provisions for the
Continental troops in service to his state, that he would “embrace the earliest proper
opening for bringing the State of Rhode Island into view again.”158 Cooke had asked
Congress to assist the troops in his state as early as November of 1777. However, due to
the fact that the Congress was acting in the capacity of Quartermaster General, Clothier
General and Commissary General, the government could not effectively respond to
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Cooke’s request when he had made it. Laurens confessed that while this excuse was
unfortunate it in no way represented a “neglect” of Rhode Island’s demands.
It was at this time that Laurens began to recognize the subtle development of
party factions within the Continental Congress. What distressed him most about this
issue was the effect that this partisanship had on public policy. Already concerned that
the machinations of Silas Deane had contributed to the financial crisis affecting the
government, Laurens began to despise the political infighting he witnessed in the
Congress. Writing to Jonathan Trumbull in January of 1778, Laurens confessed that the
entire American cause was “on the brink of a precipice.” The entities necessary for the
sustaining of the army were, “shattered and distracted,” with the Continental Congress
pressed into acting as Clothier General, Commissary General, and Quartermaster. The
purpose of this letter was to entreat Trumbull, who had acted as Commissary General
until his resignation in July of 1777, to return to his position. The failure of his
replacement to effectively carry out his responsibilities had caused more problems, not
only for the army but within the Continental Congress.159
In words appealing to Trumbull’s patriotism, and his previous service to the
country, Laurens alluded to the thanks of a grateful nation. Moreover, President Laurens
acted without the knowledge of the Congress. He acted because he recognized the
importance of having a dedicated public servant like Trumbull continue in service to the
American cause. Going above the responsibilities vested in him by his position, Laurens
recognized the considerable void that Trumbull’s absence had caused and acted to
prevent the appointment of a less qualified individual to take his place. Trumbull
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responded that while he was grateful for the president’s comments, his health precluded
him from returning to his duties. However, he did make suggestions as to where the
congress could look to find food supplies for the Continental Army and lauded the
president for his dedication to the cause.160
Seeing that the question of a permanent supply line to the Contiental Army would
not be easily answered, Henry Laurens called the congress into extra sessions in January
of 1778. The continual requests from army commanders represented a grave danger to
the success of the military as it faced a harsh winter and Laurens realized that a solution
had to be found.161 This was the question that the congress would struggle with
throughout the remainder of Henry Laurens’ term as president.
Despite his strenuous efforts to keep up with the various supply needs of the
army, Laurens began to fear that the entire enterprise was in danger of fragmenting into
chaos. In the midst of the pressing financial constraints facing the government, a serious
conflict within the Continental Army came to light. In the early weeks of January several
letters were forwarded to the president by Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, who was
encamped at Valley Forge with General Washington. These letters contained the
complaints and pointed accusations of Major General Thomas Conway against
Washington, alluding to the inability of the general to successfully command the army.
These letters had originally been sent to Major General Horatio Gates in November of
1777, but they were forwarded to General Washington through Lieutenant Colonel
Laurens. What followed next would nearly rend the fabric of the Continental Army.162
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In his letter, John Laurens informed President Laurens of the “base insult offered
to the Commander-in-Chief which will raise your indignation.” The letter, which was
obviously never meant to be seen by Washington, called him a weak general who was a
danger to the success of the army. Conway even went so far in his letter as to compare
General Washington to Frederick the Great of Prussia. The young Laurens severely
criticized General Conway, even alluding to his possible cowardice during the American
retreat from Germantown. Fearing that the Congress was dividing into factions over
Washington and the continuation of his command, John entreats his father to take an
active stance against any such divisions.163
When the news of this alleged conspiracy reached Laurens, he concealed it from
the Congress until he could have time to reflect on the situation. The issue did not fade
away as time passed. Protests from other field officers, some of whom were angered at
the fact that Conway had been promoted to Inspector General above more promising
generals, were sent to members of congress, the Board of War, and even President
Laurens. General Washington himself had already noted that Conway’s attitude toward
him in dispatches was icy and unbecoming an officer. Moreover, the reception of
General Conway at Valley Forge indicated that Washington’s staff officers were forming
their own opinions on the matter.164 Conway denied making accusations against
Washington. Furthermore, a rift developed between General Washington and General
Gates over the Conway letters which also threatened the command structure of the entire
Continental Army.165
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In a private meeting between General Conway and the president, Conway
reiterated his claims of innocence. “General Conway called on me and sat an hour,”
Laurens wrote to his son on January 25, 1778. At this meeting, Conway “assured me
there were no such words in this letter to General Gates as those quoted by the General
[Washington].” Concerned over how far the dispute between Washington and Conway
would go, Laurens confessed that “this indeed may be called a public affair and I am
afraid will become very public.” It was the issue of just how public the dispute would
become that worried the president. An internal quarrel within the Continental Army
carried with it the potential for disaster.166 Once more afflicted with an attack of gout,
Laurens was greatly concerned over this “unhappy dispute subsisting between” General
Washington and General Conway. Laurens saw such a conflict as a division that could
be used by the British to undermine the independence of the thirteen states and fracture
the tenuous union between them.167
The possibility of divisions within the Continental Congress over public policy
disturbed the president greatly. From his first days as a delegate to the congress, Laurens
had seen the gradual rise of party factions within the government. In his letter to
Commissary General Trumball, the president commented that he had witnessed the
divisions over the most minor issue of public policy. “I saw party,” he wrote, “and
lamented the prospect, every day enlightened me and I soon prognosticated evils which
we are now laboring under and which must be conquered…”168 To John Laurens, the
president confessed, “the events which I dreaded and in many instances predicted, are
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now coming to maturity.” “I feel for my country,” he continued, “I feel for the thirteen
infant states.” Vowing to settle the matter with all deliberate speed and to curtail the
development of an internal conspiracy against Washington, Laurens concluded “I will
attend to all their movements and have set my face against every wicked attempt however
specious.” Though there was no public discussion over Washington‘s command in the
congressional records, Laurens noticed the delegates taking sides. While there was not
an organized conspiracy to remove Washington, the president was concerned over the
potential for a public debate.169
The president began his own investigation.170 “I have seen the letter,” he wrote to
Isaac Motte, referring to General Conway‘s statements to General Gates. “It is true
General Washington was misinformed,” he reported, “the letter does not contain the
words which had been reported to him--but ten times worse in every view.”171 Infuriated
at being deceived by Conway, Laurens confessed that, “I had, before some late
discoveries, entertained a very high opinion of this General.”
To further aggravate the situation, Congress had debated appointing Conway as
Lafayette’s second in command for a proposed expedition into Canada.172 However,
when Lafayette had learned of General Conway’s comments regarding Washington, he
responded that he was displeased with the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief had
been insulted. In a letter dated January 26, 1778, Lafayette commented that Conway was
“most disagreeable to me and most prejudicial to the cause.” Confessing his utmost
respect and friendship for General Washington, Lafayette condemned Conway as a
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despicable and wholly contemptible individual who was unworthy of his position in the
Continental Army. He furthermore commented that had such an incident occurred in the
French army, the individual responsible “would be confined immediately and cashiered
by a court martial.”173
What had started as an off-hand comment from one field officer to another
regarding General Washington, was now a threat to the stability of the army and a matter
of great concern to the President of the Continental Congress. Lafayette alluded to the
possibility that the French officers in service to the United States would return home
should such an insult to Washington go unanswered.174 It was the possibility of losing the
alliance with France that frightened Laurens the most. Despite the presence of American
representatives in the court of France, little progress had been made on that issue. “Has
France done one act of kindness towards us but what has been plumply for the promotion
of her own interests,” he asked William Livingston. The official dispatches of Benjamin
Franklin gave no intimation that the American commissioners were close to a treaty or
alliance and Laurens was becoming visibly concerned. The veiled threat of the Marquis
de Lafayette to withdraw his support did not inspire confidence in the president and only
served to aggravate an already tense situation.175
If Lafayette were to leave North America and return to France, it was highly
likely that the majority of French officers in service to the United States would
accompany him. The ranks of the Continental Army would be depleted and, moreover,
the potential alliance with France would never materialize.176 Lafayette did not want
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Conway as his second in command and he had made his point clear in subsequent letters
to Henry Laurens. On January 31, 1778, rather than merely alluding to the possibility of
a French withdrawal, the Marquis directly threatened the President of Congress with his
resignation. Laurens kept this information hidden from the Continental Congress and
proceeded with his own investigation.177
To further complicate matters, on January 26, 1778, a mysterious letter was
delivered to the president during a session of the Continental Congress. Delivered by a
member of Congress, this letter contained comments about General Washington’s
command style and the alleged dominance of the government by the military. Declaring
that “the hearth was the proper disposition for such records,” Laurens concealed the letter
from the Congress and read it in private. Seeking to avoid being drawn further into a
partisan conflict, the president sent the letter to General Washington for his reflection.
He asked the general to keep this communication in confidence as the situation was
already growing out of hand.178
Speaking with General Gates regarding the letters from Conway, Laurens worked
to prevent a further breakdown in the army hierarchy. In a conversation with General
Gates, Laurens found him “heartily disposed to a reconciliation” with the Commander-inChief. “I have no doubt,” he added, “that the same disposition would upon enquiry be
found on the other side.” Hoping that his personal conversations with the key players in
this conspiracy would settle the matter, Laurens operated without the assistance of the
Continental Congress. Condemning General Conway’s statements as “the blackest
hypocrisy,” Laurens obtained from Gates sympathy for Washington and a personal vow
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to redeem their relationship.179
Having settled the dispute between Gates and Washington, Laurens now moved to
reassure Lafayette that the situation was well under control and that no more attempts to
impugn the authority of the Commander-in-Chief would prosper. Indeed, his public
support of General Washington throughout the Conway dispute worked to prove this
end.180 Meanwhile, the Marquis was engaged in problems of his own regarding the
proposed military expedition into Canada. Facing a severe lack of funds, and no response
from the Continental Congress on their availability, Lafayette agreed that the best
solution would be to cancel the expedition. He had communicated his decision to the
president in a letter dated February 19, 1778.181 In March of 1778, the Continental
Congress agreed that the expedition would be futile and it was finally cancelled.182 In
April of 1778, Thomas Conway expressed his wish to resign his commission as an officer
in service to the United States. President Laurens presented the general’s request to the
congress, and they accepted it without debate.183
In a letter to Lafayette, Laurens assured the French noble that he was deserving
of his own command and that he should communicate with Washington to secure such a
place for him as his service to the cause demanded. The president further ordered $6,000
(Continental currency) out of his own funds to pay the Marquis’ expenses back to Valley
Forge in compensation for his financial losses during the aborted expedition to Canada.
In the postscript of his letter to Lafayette, Laurens also commented that General Gates
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was anxious to find a suitable position for the Marquis within the army. This letter
served to reassure the Marquis that the president had successfully dealt with any attempts
to undermine the authority of General Washington. It furthermore empowered the
Marquis by assuring him that his opinions regarding the conduct of the war were valid
and had been taken into consideration.184 While Laurens entertained his own opinions of
the French government, he did not wish to lose this most valuable ally. Indeed, his
actions over the course of the Conway dispute were partially, if not fully, motivated by a
desire to maintain peaceful relations with the French government and their most
significant representative in the United States.
When Lafayette requested permission from the Congress to return to France for
the purpose of furthering diplomatic relations with the French King, Laurens presented
his esteem and the thanks of Congress for his service. Laurens also commented that
Lafayette would be “held by the good people of these states” in high regard and in
recognition for his services “an elegant sword” was to be commissioned and presented to
the Marquis by the American representatives in France.185
Having successful curtailed any possible conspiracy and, more importantly
reassured Lafayette that the government was fully behind General Washington, Laurens
had settled a potentially dangerous political question. Should Washington be challenged
in his command, the tenuous alliance between France and the American Confederation
might die in its infancy. Furthermore, the fracturing of the Continental Army over an
interpersonal conflict would have greatly damaged the morale and the legitimacy of the

184

HL to the Marquis de Lafayette. March 6, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 12: 519-521.
HL to the Marquis de Lafayette, October 24, 1778, The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume Fourteen:
July 7, 1778-December 9, 1778. David R Chesnutt, ed. 7 vols. (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1994), 14: 448.

185

55

national command structure. In his efforts to prevent such a break down, Laurens proved
to be a most capable crisis manager. He used his personal relationship with Lafayette to
prevent him from abandoning the war effort. He exercised his authority outside of
congress to get to the heart of the matter with the key players in the conspiracy.
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Chapter Three: Atrophy and the French Alliance

Less than three months into his presidency, Henry Laurens had successfully
defended George Washington against an alleged movement to displace him and
prevented a breakdown in relations between the United States and France. Laurens
redefined his scope of authority without the approval or knowledge of Congress in an
effort to clarify his position. In the months that followed the Conway dispute, Laurens
had little respite from the problems caused by the revolution. Between February and
May of 1778, as attendance to the Congress waned, Henry Laurens came into public view
as he pled for the continued support of the individual states. With ratification of a treaty
of alliance with France still a pressing concern, Laurens wanted to create a stronger union
between the thirteen states by arguing the intrinsic dangers of political leaders vacating
their national responsibilities. These were the often overlooked internal political
struggles that accompanied the American Revolution.
At the same time he was confronted with the severe lack of funds for the
Continental Army and the internal dispute between Washington and Conway, Laurens
noticed the shrinking numbers of representatives in Congress. “The house has been
reduced to nine states represented in units that we have been stagnant from a want of
members,” he wrote to John Lewis Gervais in January of 1778. This was the state of
affairs to which the general government had sunk in the months following the evacuation
of Congress from Philadelphia. Laurens confessed that had been reduced to idle debate
for days at a time due to a severe lack of representation from the states. The political
affairs of the nation were ignored, a fact that President Laurens lamented repeatedly in

57

his personal correspondence.186 Moreover, this deficit generated serious problems for the
government, problems that Laurens and the few remaining members of the Continental
Congress were forced to contend with on their own. His balancing of these concerns had
a continued effect on his personal well being.
In this same letter, Laurens complained of the pitiful state of affairs to which the
government had been reduced. Predicting doom and disaster for the general government,
not to mention the revolution itself, Laurens encouraged Gervais to send South Carolina
politicians to the Continental Congress.187 Only this action could prevent the government
from further digressing into a state of chaos in the midst of the war. It was his hope to
impress upon the leaders of the individual states the need for such an action. To
Governor William Livingston of New Jersey, Laurens commented, “our whole system is
tottering, and God only knows whether we shall be able to prop it up.”188 Due to the poor
representation in Congress, the board of war and the various government departments
responsible for distributing supplies to the army were lax in their responsibilities.
Laurens now saw to the proper distribution of the necessary supplies, in addition to his
presidential responsibilities. The volume of correspondence from the president
throughout these months indicates his dedication to the task, and demonstrates just how
serious the situation had become. In his letter to Governor Livingston, the president
commented that while the members of Congress continued to debate he had expanded his
own responsibilities by performing the duties of other officers.189
“The powers of Congress fall short of compulsive means,” Laurens again wrote to
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Livingston in January of 1778. The Continental Congress, while a national assembly, did
not have the ability to compel the individual states to pursue a course of action. This was
the inherent flaw of the American Confederation, in that the national government lacked
the power that was necessary to enforce its legislation. In addition, the government now
lacked members, which represented a serious problem. “We want of genius for striking
out new matter,” he continued, “for correcting errors and repressing dangerous
appearances.”190 To Rhode Island Governor Nicolas Cooke, Laurens commented that
while the Congress was working on settling the issue of supplies and funds for the army,
the debates “fall heavily upon a very few members, from 17 to 21 who faithfully attend
their duty.” Some of the representatives who attended could not act because their
individual state constitutions required a minimum of their delegations to be present.
Several times, Laurens alludes to the frustration of the Congress over members who
attended the regular meetings but could not legally participate. Noting the seriousness of
the army’s plight, the president informed Governor Cooke that “these circumstances”
were the root cause of the sluggish nature of the general government and not an example
of purposeful neglect by Congress of national concerns.191 However, “the unaccountable
deficiencies” in the government were beginning to weigh heavily on President Laurens’
mind. Praising those few members who continued to attend the meetings of Congress,
Laurens assured the leadership of the several states that the general government was not
slipping towards chaos. Even so, he personally feared such an occurrence.192
It was the lack of congressional delegates, compounded with the desperate need

190
191
192

HL to William Livingston, January 27, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 12: 356.
HL to Nicholas Cooke, January 3, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 12: 240-241.
HL to William Heath, January 5, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 12: 249.

59

of supplies for the army, that motivated Henry Laurens to call Congress into extra
sessions beginning in January of 1778. To satisfy the pressing needs of the Continental
Army, Laurens realized those few members present needed to perform the duties of the
entire government. The “urgent and important business, which requires immediate
dispatch” that the president spoke of in his letter to the delegates outlined the state of
affairs for the government during this time. Laurens recognized the need for the
Congress to compensate for the gradual ebbing of its membership by dedicating more
hours to the plight of the nation. The scant few remaining delegates, ranging from 17 to
21, and even less at times, whole heartedly agreed.193 “There are presently 21 members
on the floor,” he wrote to New York Governor George Clinton in January of 1778. Of
these 21 delegates, Laurens spoke highly of their devotion to the cause. However, “in
order to guard against the dispersion of the army,“ he wrote, Congress was forced to act
as “Quartermaster General, Clothier General, Commissary General.” Laurens realized
that this effort could not be maintained indefinitely. Adding his own sentiments to the
letter, Laurens requested that Governor Clinton send “more ample representation from
the State of New York” to fill the void within the Continental Congress. In the winter of
1778, New York was represented by only one delegate, William Duer. The rest of that
state’s six member delegation had left the capital for public pursuits within New York
and throughout the United States. Consequently, New York could contribute little to the
sessions of Congress until it had reached its required quorum. Laurens made this fact
clear in his letter to the governor.194
Laurens reiterated this same request to the government of South Carolina on
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January 26, 1778. Even his home state was a contributing factor to this crisis of
representation. Poor representation endangered the ability of the Continental Congress to
effectively govern the thirteen states. “I hope the states will be roused,” Laurens wrote,
“[to] fill their representations in Congress with wise and spirited men.” The success of
the revolution and the independence of the thirteen colonies depended on this. “If the
states do not exert themselves,” the president commented, “their Stewards will complete
their ruin and disgrace.”195 Laurens saw the lack of representation as a contributing factor
to the destruction of the tenuous union of states. Not only could the union suffer from
this atrophy, but the very success of the American Revolution.
Laurens realized that the deficiencies within the Congress were affecting every
aspect of the war effort. When the president moved to appoint Brigadier Generals within
the state of South Carolina, he was vexed to find that once again there were not enough
members in attendance to discuss the issue. When he pressed the resolution before those
members present, Laurens was informed that “there was no body on the floor to take up
and improve the suggestions from the chair.”196 Angered, the president retired to his
study and wrote a frustrated letter to Isaac Motte. “We deserve the evil of this delay,” he
wrote, “for our shameful and unpardonable delay of filing up our delegacy with sensible
vigilant faithful citizens.”197
Thinking of the American image in the courts of Europe, most especially in the
court of France, Laurens argued that the revolutionary movement could become a farce.
To further compound his anguish, Laurens was aware that certain individuals were
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profiting from the war effort and had set aside funds for themselves while the Continental
Army suffered for want of provisions and funds in its winter camp. “Knaves and fools
are building enormous estates,” he said of the vast corruption among state officials and
private individuals who were profiting from the war effort, “sapping the foundations of
liberty, virtue, and their country.” To Laurens, these individuals were as greedy as the
British Parliament. They were abusing the trust given to them by the American
government and providing for their greed.198 Realizing the danger of such profiteering,
Laurens went to Congress to counteract those responsible.
Reporting this news directly to the Congress, Laurens encouraged the creation of
the office of Auditor of Army Accounts, to determine where public money was being
used wisely. Recognizing the dire need for such a position, Laurens persuaded Congress
to empower the public auditors with the ability to prosecute any individual responsible
for the misuse of government funds to the fullest extent of the law. This was the
president’s most stringent effort to unravel the web of corruption that he noticed
spreading throughout the young nation. Laurens further added that any individual guilty
of subversion against the United States should be dealt with promptly. The resolution
was discussed and approved by the Continental Congress in February of 1778. Though
Congress suffered from a lack of membership, those delegates present were rallied by
Laurens to take decisive action. Not only did Laurens publicly advocate this position, but
he helped to draft the document that created it.199
As a result of the creation of this office, several individuals who had
misappropriated public funds were brought to justice. Laurens presented this information
198
199

Ibid, 12: 345.
Ford, JCC, 10: 131-136.

62

to the Congress and voted in favor of a full investigation. At one point, an investigation
into the actions of the various administrators of the Commissary departments seemed to
unmask a high-ranking officer responsible for using public money for his own personal
gain. When Colonel Benjamin Flower was accused by his deputy, Cornelius Sweers, of
such malfeasance of office, the Congress ordered his immediate arrest.200 Though it
pained him to see such a dedicated soldier as Colonel Flower named in this investigation,
Laurens nonetheless approved of the action. His previous experiences with corruption
under the royal government in South Carolina firmed his resolve. Entrusting Colonel
Flower to the guardianship of Major General Benedict Arnold, the Congress ordered a
further investigation into Sweers’ accusations.201 When it was determined that Colonel
Flower had nothing to do with the misappropriation of public money, and in fact
Cornelius Sweers was the responsible party, all charges against the colonel were dropped
and his rank and privileges restored.202
While Colonel Flower was innocent of any wrongdoing, corruption and general
dissention certainly existed within the departments of the government.203 With the
approval of Congress, Laurens began a long term correspondence with the leadership of
the thirteen states to remind state executives of the importance of national unity and
adequate representation in Congress. Using the examples of profiteering, Laurens hoped
to expose the dangers of a government unable to manage its own affairs. Throughout
February and March of 1778, the president sent passionately worded reminders to South
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Carolina, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York.204 This was the only means to impress
upon state leaders the importance of having full delegations in attendance. While the
orders had come from the Congress, the words and thoughts were his own. Laurens
realized the enormity of his task and the importance of a swift response from the states.
To further compound his anguish over the lack of proper representation with the
Congress, Laurens was forced to chide one of his colleagues for neglecting his
responsibilities. When North Carolina Delegate Thomas Burke refused to attend a
session of the Continental Congress in April of 1778, Laurens sent a messenger from the
meeting room to Burke’s residence in York. Burke refused to appear before the Congress
and forced a delay in the day’s business. Claiming that only his home state of North
Carolina had the authority to command his attendance at congressional meetings, Burke
ignored the order of Congress. This response infuriated the president, who dispatched the
messenger again to Burke’s residence. Laurens and the remaining delegates determined
that an official sanction would be the best course of action. Burke was compelled to
appear before the Congress on April 24, 1778 and answer for his act of defiance.205
The first congressional inquiry into the actions of one of its own members began
and ended on that day. After restating his claim that the Congress did not have the
authority to compel him to attend its meetings, Burke claimed that he had received no
such mandate from the North Carolina Assembly empowering him to return.206 When the
Congress voted on whether or not to expel Burke, Laurens voted against such an action as
detrimental to the general government. The Congress had already lost a significant
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portion of its membership and until North Carolina appointed a new delegate, Burke was
needed.207 Subsequently, the Continental Congress ordered the full record of the
proceedings concerning Thomas Burke to be sent to the North Carolina Assembly.208
Henry Laurens wrote an attachment to the official message sent by the assembly from
York. “I am persuaded it is not the desire of Congress,” he wrote to North Carolina
Governor Richard Caswell, “to take advantage of Mr. Burke, nor hurt his character by
impressions made in his absence on the minds of his fellow citizens…” His intention in
calling Burke before the Congress and supporting the motion to censure him was due to
the need for every available delegate to perform their duly appointed task. In this letter,
Laurens maintained that it was not the result of individual bias or any political fracturing
within the general government that had brought about this course of action. It was simply
a matter of maintaining a quorum.209
Delegate Burke believed his term in the Continental Congress was over, in
accordance with the constitution of the state of North Carolina. In his response to
Laurens’ request that he present himself to the body immediately, Burke informed the
president that he had received no orders from North Carolina empowering him to
continue to speak for that government. He therefore resolved to quit the house and await
further instructions from his home assembly.210 While this was the proper thing to do
given the protocol of the day, it aggravated an already serious problem. However,
President Laurens was concerned over the disturbing inability of the Congress to function
without members. Burke was singled out because he was physically in York, but had
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refused to return to the floor as requested.211 As Laurens had commented to Samuel
Adams, “Able men are exceedingly necessary in Congress at this time.”212
“All the states have been exceedingly remiss in their respective representations in
Congress,” the president wrote to Jacob Zahn in April of 1778. “A remiss,” he added,
“which will cost them millions of dollars, and which had one time exposed our cause to
the most imminent danger.”213 Laurens was certain that if the thirteen states were to work
together, militarily as well as politically, that they could drive the British from North
America.214 Obviously, the president realized that unity was just as important to the
success of the cause as a military alliance with France. This was what had motivated
Laurens in his tireless efforts throughout the winter months of 1777 and 1778. Slowly,
the individual states responded to the president’s repeated requests for delegates.
Throughout the months of April, May, and June of 1778, the states sent new
representatives to fill the vacancies within the Continental Congress. Though the
president continued to express his concern over inadequate representation, his efforts
over the previous months were beginning to bear fruit.215
Having weathered a particularly difficult political quagmire regarding the disputes
between Washington, Gates, and Conway, the Congress was engaged in another serious
issue that concerned the president. The military and commercial alliance with the
government of France played heavily into Henry Laurens’ actions while President of the
Continental Congress. Throughout his final months in office, Laurens added the final
touches to the alliance and welcomed America’s first official diplomatic representative
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from another country.
Recognition by a powerful European nation such as France was essential to
victory in the American Revolution. Laurens was aware of this even before he began his
term as president, and he endeavored to achieve the much desired alliance between
France and the United States. During the Conway incident and Laurens’ struggle with
congressional atrophy, important steps were taken toward an official alliance with the
French government. However, just as the Congress was about to discuss the wording of
the alliance, another serious concern came to light.
The main issue facing Henry Laurens and the adoption of a treaty of alliance
between France and the United States concerned the possibility of peace overtures from
the British government. To accept a military and commercial alliance with the French
could close the door on any possible reconciliation between Great Britain and her former
colonies. As President of Congress, Laurens had received information that General Sir
William Howe had been instructed to make a settlement with the American government
in November of 1777. This news had been delivered to the president through another
member of the Congress and presented to the general assembly. A Pennsylvania
merchant named John Brown claimed to have escaped occupied Philadelphia with “a
verbal message to Congress from General Howe.” Since the message was delivered
orally through an intermediary Congress refused to consider it. “Such conduct
administers just grounds of suspicion,” the Congress resolved, “that he is employed by
the enemy for purposes inimical to these states.”216 Laurens himself found this news to be
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“mysterious” and did not consider such an offer to carry any serious weight.217
Accordingly, the Congress ordered Brown to be arrested and held by the government of
Pennsylvania.218
The American government, and President Laurens, considered any statements
sent through intermediaries regarding the continuation of the war to be specious. “The
[British] administration was greatly shocked,” Laurens commented to the Marquis de
Lafayette, “by the account of Mr. Burgoyne’s surrender, but it does not appear from any
hints dropped on their part that they were disposed to terminate their dispute with
America.”219 “There possibly will be attempts to treat for peace,” he continued, “but I do
not expect anything substantial to follow, but blows…”220 In this letter, the president
warned the Marquis that the “monied people of England” were becoming alarmed at the
length of the conflict and had begun to throw their support into the British effort. If this
trend were to run unabated, Laurens argued, the future of the revolution would be in
greater jeopardy.221
The president urged Lafayette to be an advocate for the American cause with his
French peers. The fact that Laurens had urged Lafayette to return to Valley Forge to
work with Washington after the cancellation of his military expedition into Canada
demonstrated his concern to keep the Frenchman true to the cause.222
When news arrived of a treaty of alliance between the United States and France,
all that Laurens had worked so hard for seemed to pay off. However, the acceptance of
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that treaty while considering peace overtures from the British government was a
hindrance to an effective alliance. Laurens did not trust the British, and neither did many
within the government. In his letters to Lafayette, the president warned of the misleading
nature of England’s overtures. From May to July of 1778, Laurens balanced overtures
from British commissioners and the French alliance he had fought so hard to achieve.
Henry Laurens wanted peace with Great Britain but he wanted it to be on
“honorable terms,” meaning the full recognition of American independence.223 The
stunning American victory over the forces of General Burgoyne at Saratoga led the
British government to reconsider its position on America. To add further concern, news
that the American government was close to a treaty of alliance with France forced Prime
Minister Lord Frederick North to reconsider his position in December of 1777. In a
speech before Parliament, Lord North offered the United States a repeal of all taxes and
acts that had caused the Americans to rebel against that crown.224 He further promised
the states freedom to elect their own governors and civil administrators, as well as the
power to determine their own political futures. North even promised to recognize the
legitimacy of the Continental Congress as a governing body. This decision was passed
through the Parliament at the same time the treaty of alliance with France was being
signed by American plenipotentiaries in Paris.225 While this news was what Henry
Laurens had always wanted, he viewed the Prime Minister’s decision with skepticism.
“Admitting this suspicion to be grounded in experience,” Laurens wrote in April of 1778,
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“we ought to be ready and early with a formidable army in the field.”226
The Marquis de Lafayette had warned Laurens that Lord North had no intention
of allowing America to be free of British rule. Rather, the Marquis surmised that North’s
attempt at reconciliation was an effort to further divide the government.227 Thinking the
peace overtures to be a ploy to destroy the union, Laurens advocated a unified, well
prepared military for the coming campaign season. Regarding the peace proposals from
Lord North, the president concluded that Britain’s overtures were meant to confuse the
Congress while the new British commander, Sir Henry Clinton, prepared to break the
back of the Continental Army. The movements of General Clinton greatly concerned the
board of war, General Washington, and President Laurens.228
France and England raced to present their case to the Americans. Great Britain
wanted to prevent the Continental Congress from approving a treaty between the United
States and France. A commission headed by the Earl of Carlisle was appointed in
February of 1778 and sent to the United States. This commission was empowered to treat
with the Continental Congress and reach a settlement regarding the conflict.229 At the
same time, the treaty with France was on its way to York for approval. “If war is
declared between France and England,” Laurens confessed, “the British troops may be
wanted for defending their islands.” In that case, he argued, the military situation in
America would improve for the states. The intrinsic benefit of the French alliance,
according to Laurens, would be to force Britain to defend the isles. Personally, the
thought of continued warfare concerned the president greatly. Having witnessed first
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hand the dangers of such conflicts, Laurens was in no way eager to see England ravaged
by invasion.230
On January 13, 1778, the treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed in Paris
between the United States and France. The Treaty of Alliance and an additional
document, known as the Act Separate and Secret, was signed in Paris on February 6,
1778. These documents guaranteed military assistance to the United States in her war
with Great Britain and allowed for the continuation of friendly relations between the
United States and the government of France. In the preamble, King Louis XVI promised
to recognize the United States as a favored nation. The treaties finally arrived at York on
May 2, 1778 and the Continental Congress immediately considered them.231 With regard
to the promises made by the French and the stipulations of the treaties, Laurens
commented “’tis very well.”232
While Congress began considering the treaties from Paris, the British peace
commission arrived in the city of Philadelphia in April of 1778. General Sir Henry
Clinton had ordered the evacuation of the city. The British military was engaged in a
general withdrawal at the same time the peace commissioners arrived to begin their
meetings with the American government.233 “Poor old England,” Laurens wrote in May
of 1778, “she is said to be in great distress and I believe it.”234
With the president encouraging the adoption of the treaties, the Continental
Congress quickly ratified the alliance on May 4, 1778.235 A great weight had been lifted
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from the shoulders of Henry Laurens. With recognition of America as an independent
nation by the French government came military and financial assistance, plus the promise
of equal assistance from nations like Spain and Prussia. Regarding the arrival of the
British peace commission, Laurens felt that news of a treaty with France would “oblige
them to shape a new course.” Writing to General Washington in May of 1778, the
president stated that “the people in general had very sensibly felt the weight of the war,
were ardently desirous of peace and anxious lest Congress should reject the intended
propositions.” Having received news from several individuals with whom he had dealt in
the mercantile industry, Laurens recognized a distinct change in the perception of the
business elite of England regarding the war. Though not representing the sentiments of
the general populace, these individuals were growing concerned.236
However, Laurens also realized that the war would not end quickly. “Britain will
not be hummed by a stroke of policy,” he wrote to Baron von Steuben, “…a powerful
army in our own fields may, should I say, will, be the only means of securing an
honorable peace.”237 The die had been cast and the president realized that there would be
no turning back; not for the United States and most definitely not for Great Britain.
While Laurens worked to publicize the alliance between the United States and
France he also sought to conceal the news of the British peace commission. He even
encouraged Congress not to appoint a delegation to meet with the British commission, as
individuals could not properly represent the interests of the entire government and that
British delegates could no doubt use that to their advantage.238 Realizing the dangers of
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acknowledging the British peace overtures, Laurens and the rest of the Congress stressed
the importance of the French alliance over any offers made by Great Britain. Had these
offers been made at the start of hostilities, it is possible that the American government
would have been more receptive. It was too late now, especially for Henry Laurens.239
The business of government continued as Laurens prepared to receive the official
representative from France. In the meantime, Benjamin Franklin had been officially
presented to the court of King Louis XVI and accorded all the honors of a formal
ambassador. The official exchange of representatives gave the assent to the recognition
of the United States as a sovereign nation by her first military ally. At this point, Laurens
resolved that any agreement reached between the United States and Great Britain would
occur only when the latter recognized the sovereign status of the United States. In his
congressional role, Laurens favored a stern resistance to any attempts at negotiation that
did not recognize these principals. The door of reconciliation that the president had once
referred to had been closed. It was now essential for the belligerents to treat one another
as enemies. Great Britain would now have to reach a settlement with citizens of a new
nation and not subjects engaged in a rebellion.240
“There may be an arduous work to perform,” Laurens wrote regarding the
potential for disaster should France and her allies not engage England, “I perceive a long
train of direful consequences to America.”241 While he waited to hear from the British
peace commission, now settling in Philadelphia, Laurens dedicated his efforts to

239
240
241

HL to Baron von Steuben, May 11, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 13: 291.
HL to Louis Duportail, May 20, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 13: 335.
Ibid, 13: 340.

73

reforming the Continental Army and preparing for the next stage of the conflict.242
Maintaining his allegiance to the French alliance also benefited Laurens in unexpected
ways. Though he recognized the importance of commercial and military treaties with
other European nations, his main concern was securing the treaty with France. As a
result of the machinations of Commissioners Silas Deane, John Adams and Benjamin
Franklin, Congress now had the potential to negotiate treaties with Holland, Denmark,
Sweden, and possibly Russia.243
In response to General Sir Henry Clinton’s withdrawal from Philadelphia and his
repeated insistence on a meeting with Congress to discuss an end to the hostilities,
Laurens remained firm. “Be assured sir,” he argued, “when the King of Great Britain
shall be seriously disposed to put an end to the unprovoked and cruel war waged against
the United States, Congress will readily attend to such terms of peace.”244 The fact that
Clinton had decided to abandon Philadelphia and remove his forces from the vicinity
concerned the president greatly. “The idea of the enemy’s intended abandonment of
Philadelphia, pervades every mind,” he wrote to John Laurens, “I am very certain our
cause suffers greatly from the general belief of an event being at hand.” The event that
the president feared concerned the unseen movements of Clinton’s forces once they had
withdrawn from Philadelphia. General Washington’s army was still not up to full
strength and as yet no news had been heard from France regarding a military action
against Great Britain.245
At the height of this concern, the president received official notification from the
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British peace commission regarding their offers to the government of the United States.
Consisting of Frederick, Earl of Carlisle, George Johnston, and William Eden, this
commission offered all the privileges authorized by Lord North and the Parliament.
However, the commissioners did not recognize the independent status of the United
States.246 The commission observed that America was under “the insidious interposition
of a power, which has from the first settlement of these colonies been actuated with
enmity to both of us.”247
In response to this letter, Laurens reminded the commissioners that the decision to
end the war was in the hands of the British. “You are undoubtedly acquainted with the
only terms upon which Congress can treat,” he wrote to George Johnstone. “Permit me
to add,” he continued, “the true interest of Great Britain in the present advance of the
contest will be found in confirming our independence.” Plainly stating the case, the
president concluded his letter with a firm reminder that no communications from the
British government would be considered unless the independent status of the United
States were fully recognized. This right of sovereignty included the right to conduct
peace negotiations on an equal footing with Great Britain and to negotiate treaties with
allies.248
When another letter from the British peace commission arrived in June of 1778,
the president immediately put it forward for the consideration of Congress. They
resolved that since the letter contained defamatory statements about France, the
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commissioners were not serious in their diplomatic efforts.249 America was moving away
from Great Britain, to secure an independent future for itself. By refusing to negotiate
with the peace commissioners, Laurens was advocating the official national policy of the
United States. Though the commission seemed to be offering a great deal, it had not
recognized the distinct national entity that had emerged in North America. Henry
Laurens had, and although not originally a proponent of independence he altered his
views. A resolution by Congress, signed by President Laurens, informed the British
commission that the states will “be ready to enter upon the consideration of a Treaty of
Peace and Commerce, not inconsistent with Treaties already subsisting, when the King of
Great Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose.” The British
commission had erred when they supposed “the people of these states to be subjects of
the crown of Great Britain,” rather than citizens of a free nation.250
The Congress opposed meeting the representatives of Great Britain. The failure
to recognize American independence was a vital obstruction to the peace process.
Laurens advocated a firm stance against the peace commissioners in light of the treaty
with France and the potential for absolute victory. Had the Continental Congress
accepted the terms of the British peace commission they would meet on an equal footing.
The commissioners addressed the Congress as the governing body of the United States,
but only as a provincial assembly whose authority was derived from the King of Great
Britain. Outraged at the disparaging remarks made by the peace commission towards the
government of France, Laurens remarked that while the commission had offered nominal
self-determination to the United States, they had given no intimation of American
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sovereignty. “If all the fine things now offered had been tendered some time ago,”
Laurens wrote to General Horatio Gates, “there can be no doubt but that the people of
America would joyfully have embraced the proposition.” Now, however, “what answer
can be given but that which was rendered to foolish virgins--’the door is shut.’”251
America’s destiny was now in the hands of the French, or at least for the moment
it was dependent on the assistance of the French government. Henry Laurens was well
aware of the importance of a commercial and military alliance with France. Having
fought for it throughout his presidency, the fulfillment of that desire did not cause him to
become lax in his duty to the nation. As President of Congress, Laurens realized the
importance of balancing his personal feelings with the will of the government. While he
did not support the overtures of the British peace commission, he did not agree with
congressional policy regarding any correspondence from the commission. In an effort to
determine the legitimacy of the commissions proposals, and perhaps to determine what
inducement were offered to members, Congress resolved to make public all letters from
the British peace commission to its members. Henry Laurens objected to this on the
principal that those letters “were not intended for the public eye.”252
It was the issue of public perception that concerned the president the most during
this time. Congress was considering the Articles of Confederation for several months.
Also, with the evacuation of Philadelphia, Laurens was uncertain of the movements of
the British army in North America.253 However, with the British withdrawal from
Philadelphia, the Continental Congress was able to return to its former home. “Congress
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will adjourn this morning to Philadelphia,” Laurens wrote to Rawlins Lowndes, “I have
many things to day and to hear in a short space of time.”254
The American victory over the British at Monmouth, New Jersey, in June of 1778
afforded Laurens the opportunity to celebrate a fortunate turn of luck for the United
States. As he settled into his new quarters in Philadelphia, Laurens was able to reflect on
the changing situation for the United States. This victory was another cause for
celebration, the deliverance of Washington and a significant portion of his army from
what Laurens had called a “snare” coincided with the news of the much coveted French
alliance. The efforts of the British peace commission to dissuade Laurens and Congress
from allying with France had failed. “I rejoice at the late happy event,” the president
wrote to John Laurens.255 Informing Congress of the happy news, Laurens expressed his
gratitude to General Washington and the army.256 Congress subsequently resolved to
thank Washington “for his distinguished exertions in forming the order of battle” in this
significant victory.257
With France firmly secured as an ally, Laurens confronted the British peace
commission with a renewed resolve. He successfully balanced the offers of the British
representatives with the will of Congress and enacted the alliance that he had fought so
hard to attain. Claiming the promises made by the British commission had come too late
to be considered valid, Laurens was able to firm up the resolve of his congressional
colleagues. He had reached a stage in his own ideological evolution where he could
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dismiss such overtures and concentrate his energies on stimulating America’s new
relationship with France.
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Chapter Four: Foreign and Domestic Affairs
Henry Laurens had already established himself as a dedicated advocate for the
American cause well before he assumed the presidency of Congress in November of
1777. Through his efforts to entreat the states to adhere to the resolutions of the
Continental Congress, Laurens performed an essential diplomatic service to the nation.
This much is evident in the correspondence with the leaders of the individual state
governments throughout his presidency. He was also vested with the responsibility of
maintaining the cordial relationship between the United States and France. For this to
succeed, military as well as diplomatic cooperation between the two nations was
required. Henry Laurens was the conduit through which this cooperation would travel.
However, as he would soon discover, maintaining the alliance with France was far more
difficult than achieving it.
In the winter of 1778, Laurens confronted a set of conflicts that resulted from the
much coveted alliance with France. With the resources of the national government
already taxed to the limit, Laurens was faced with renewed proposals from America’s
ally to undertake costly expeditions into British controlled territory in East Florida and
Canada. He faced these challenges with a mixture of determination to maintain the
alliance and a firm resolve not to allow America’s concerns to be rendered secondary to
those of the powers of Europe. The remaining months of his presidency found Laurens
still arguing against the British peace commission while encouraging the states to
cooperate with the wishes of the Continental Congress.
The American Confederation as it existed in 1778 did not give the federal
government the broad powers that the government has at present. This was an evolution
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that came only after the flaws in the confederation had been scrutinized. While the
Continental Congress was a national legislature, it did not have the power to govern the
states. Its main purpose was to create and sustain a common defense against the military
power of Great Britain. At this time, the United States was a collective union of
sovereign political entities. As a result of that belief, Henry Laurens had to impress upon
the states the need to cooperate with Congress.
Laurens could not simply order the government of New York or his home state of
South Carolina to adhere to the wishes of Congress. Moreover, the Congress lacked the
necessary powers to enforce its legislation without the assent of the individual states.
However, as a mediator, the president was able to persuade the states to take actions in
accordance with the will of the general government. Laurens excelled at the often vexing
art of inter-state diplomatic relations, especially when the greater purpose of the nation’s
survival was at stake.
When the state delegates failed to appear at session of the Congress, Laurens had
appealed to the individual state leaders. Not only did he warn of the fall of the entire
American Confederation, but of the more immediate threat to their homes, should the
British prevail. How could a state not send its delegates to Congress when that state’s
own interests were at stake. He even chastised his own state for not sending a full
delegation to Congress.258 When rampant profiteering among the merchants of
Massachusetts was revealed, the president appealed to the Massachusetts Assembly,
appealing to their sense of responsibility. He asked Massachusetts to enact legislation

258

HL to John Lewis Gervais, December 30, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 12: 220-226.

81

that would make it illegal to profiteer from the war effort.259
In an effort to curtail the financial crisis that had brought the Continental Army to
its knees, the Congress had agreed on a tax for the individual states. This tax, which
would help with the massive financial burden faced by the Congress, was meant to raise
$5 million over a year’s time. In November of 1777, Congress debated the issue and
after much revision the resolution was passed on November 22, 1777.260 The records of
the Continental Congress credit Henry Laurens with a significant portion revising much
of the wording of the tax resolution. Laurens altered the original document to make it
sound less like a tax and more like a request for additional funding, with the promise to
provide suitable recompense to the states over time. His explanation to the individual
states stressed the importance of raising this money to provide clothing and supplies to
the Continental Army during its winter camp at Valley Forge.261
From his first glimpse at the workings of the national assembly, Laurens realized
that if America were to endure, the states would have to act like a nation and cooperate
on the issues that were important to the whole. A plan of union was the key
steppingstone for the building of that nation. When the Congress began considering the
Articles of Confederation during his first weeks as a delegate, Laurens became vexed at
just how difficult the process had become. “I think I have been instrumental in averting
two pernicious schemes,” he wrote in September of 1777 regarding the debates over the
issues of taxation and the proportion of a state’s representation in Congress.262 Shortly
before the evacuation of Congress from Philadelphia in 1777, Laurens noted that despite
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the crisis atmosphere, the delegates continued to debate every word of the proposed
articles. “Fright,” he commented, “works lunacy.” Laurens noticed that despite the crisis
atmosphere of the moment the debates still continued.263
When Congress began to discuss a system for taxing the individual states as a
means of gaining additional revenue, Laurens commented that while “two days have been
amused in conning it, some sensible things have been said, and as much nonsense as ever
I heard in so short a space.” Despite all of his concern over the confusion caused by the
intense debate among the members of Congress, Laurens advocated a compromise over a
stalemate. As always with the debates of Congress, Laurens sought to avoid becoming
involved in sectional disputes. His intense dislike for factions motivated his efforts to
play the part of mediator. Although at times he did take sides on an issue, it was only
after serious consideration of the facts.264 The adoption of the Articles of Confederation
represented a great leap forward in the process of building an independent nation. As
Laurens had noted during the debates over the articles, the ratification process required its
own special skill to convince the states to accept the final document.265
Adopted by the Continental Congress in November of 1777, the Articles of
Confederation were sent to the individual states for their consideration.266 “These
papers,” Laurens wrote, “so expressive of the meaning and good views of Congress
require no attempt to a more minute detail of their several contents.” It was Laurens’
hope that the articles would be quickly reviewed and approved by the individual states.267
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However, Laurens did understand the necessity of a continual review of the articles, due
to the hasty nature in which they had been approved. The building of a nation was not a
feat that could not be accomplished in the period of a few months, especially in the midst
of a war for that nation’s survival. While he commented that the articles were not a
perfect plan, he wanted them ratified by the states. Discussion and revision could follow,
if necessary. He was almost certain that they would need to be revised once the military
crisis had concluded.268
Between March and July of 1778, various amendments and substitutions to the
articles were proposed by the individual state delegations. Congress continued to revise
and debate the Articles of Confederation throughout Laurens’ term as president.269 When
the final copy of the articles had been approved by the Continental Congress in June of
1778, Laurens hoped to have it signed by the end of the month. However, due to a series
of printing mistakes, the document could not be signed before Congress left York and
returned to Philadelphia. When Congress reconvened in Philadelphia in July of 1778, the
Articles of Confederation were three states short of being duly ratified. The three states
which had not approved of the articles were Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey. North
Carolina and Georgia had approved, but their delegations were not present at this meeting
of Congress and therefore could not give their assent.270 “Congress intent upon the
present and future security of these United States has never ceased to consider a
Confederacy as the great principal of union,” Laurens wrote to the leaders of Delaware,
Maryland, and New Jersey. He urged the leadership of these states to consider the future
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security of the nation over any semantic disputes that might arise from the articles.271 The
Articles of Confederation were not finally ratified by the Continental Congress until
March of 1781, after years of debate over the land boundaries of the states.272
While Laurens was often perplexed by the divergent natures of the individual
state governments, especially considering the importance of unity at a time of crisis, he
proved himself to be adept at rallying them to the cause. He successfully balanced the
interests of the individual states with the concerns of the national government. He was
able to provide firm guidance without actually possessing the power to compel the states
to pursue a course of action.
Laurens was also quite adept at maintaining friendly personal relationships with
powerful European nobles, such as the young Marquis de Lafayette. The alliance with
France would not have materialized had Lafayette lost faith in Henry Laurens and his
abilities to bring reason and firm judgment to the government, particularly during the
Conway dispute. Furthermore, had Laurens not exerted every effort to placate the young
Marquis regarding the alleged conspiracy against General Washington and Lafayette’s
failed mission into Canada, he would never have gained the young Frenchman’s trust.
While the Conway-Washington dispute is one of the few instances where Laurens
demonstrates partisan sentiments, his actions were based not only on his feelings for
Washington, but out of concern for the stability of the Continental Army and the success
of the French alliance.
It was after the military and commercial alliance with France had been duly
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ratified by the American Congress that Laurens expanded his diplomatic role. As
attaining this alliance was essential to the success of the American Revolution,
maintaining that alliance was equally important. Before the ink had dried on the official
documents that certified the alliance, the Congress began to make plans to receive the
emissary from France, Conrad-Alexandre Gerard. Henry Laurens played an important
role in the establishment of the official exchange of representatives between the allies.
His interactions with Gerard allowed Laurens to learn more of French intentions in
America once the war had concluded.
Gerard had been dispatched by the court of France to represent the interests of his
government in the United States. Accompanying him on his journey to America was a
squadron of warships that had been dispatched to protect the beleaguered coastline of the
United States. Aboard the French vessel Lanquedoc, Vice-Admiral Count Charles-Henri
d’Estaing informed the president, “I have the honor sir to remit to your excellency [a]
copy of my credential letter.”273 Count d’Estaing headed a fleet of 14 warships and five
frigates, which had been sent at the behest of the French government and at the urging of
the American Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, Benjamin Franklin.274
The count also informed Laurens that “a minister who has been so happy as to
have had the indelible glory of signing a treaty which unites two powers whose interests
are so intimately connected,” would be following his arrival. The count was referring to
the imminent arrival of Gerard, who was on board the French fleet.275 Writing to North
Carolina Governor Richard Caswell, President Laurens urged him “to pursue the most
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effectual measures to apprise the commander of the French squadron, Le Compte
d’Estaing, of any English ships of war which may come into any of the harbors or inlets
of the state of North Carolina.” The president further urged Governor Caswell to
“accommodate the squadron or any of the ships of our ally the King of France with
proper pilots,” for navigating American rivers, “if required.”276 The moment that Henry
Laurens had hoped for had arrived. France was sending military assistance to the United
States to aid in its struggle for independence. Congress followed Laurens’ suggestion in
July of 1778, and ordered the Commander-in-Chief and the American military to
cooperate with d’Estaing.277
With the arrival of French military assistance, the English view of the war in
America began to change. At the beginning of July, Laurens had been made aware of a
political upheaval within Great Britain. According to the news articles, published in
England in April of 1778, the British Parliament had discussed the idea of authorizing
American independence as a condition for negotiation. Laurens noted that “the whole
nation” had entered a period of “great distraction.”278 To the Count d’Estaing, President
Laurens forwarded the response of the Continental Congress to the repeated letters from
the British peace commission. He took this action as a sign that America was firm in its
devotion to the alliance with France. He also urged d’Estaing “to open a communication
with General Washington” in order that the French and American forces might cooperate
in their military endeavors against “our common enemy.”279 To Washington, the
president remarked, “it is unnecessary to intimate to your excellency the propriety of
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opening and keeping up a correspondence with Admiral Count d’Estaing,” to further that
purpose.280 An official resolution reiterating this request was written by a committee of
the Congress and sent to Washington on July 11, 1778.281
Laurens’ diplomatic efforts did not extend solely to inter-state and foreign
political relations. Keeping a positive relationship with the military officers of the
Continental Army was equally important. When the French military came to assist the
Americans, establishing a positive relationship with the French military became a key
component to the success of the alliance. In fact, his efforts to build up the French
alliance resulted in the American government moving away from any potential thought of
reconciliation with Great Britain. This became especially important as Laurens received
Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, the new French minister. At Laurens’ insistence, Congress
immediately appointed a committee to prepare for the official reception of the
emissary.282
Shortly after Gerard arrived in America, Laurens began a personal relationship
with him as a means of furthering the alliance. Though the congressional committee
discussed the proper honors and tributes to bestow on the ambassador, the president
wanted to learn more about his mission to the United States by transcending political
relationships and establishing a friendship with him.283 “He intimated to me his powers
for appearing in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, or more simply, a resident,”
Laurens wrote. “The court of France probably could not have discovered a man in
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Europe so equal to the task,” he continued, “as is Monsieur Gerard--a man of politeness,
good breeding, and affability without troublesome ceremony.”284
Laurens took the time to get to know Gerard, not only the parameters of his
diplomatic mission but his personal motivations for supporting the American cause. It
was Gerard’s hope to be recognized as a full ambassador by the Congress since he had
arrived from France with full powers from the king. Though Laurens informed Gerard
that such a decision “awaited the determination of Congress,” he advocated such a
distinction be made. What had motivated Laurens to pursue this course was his concern
over the interests of the United States among the powers of Europe. Congress was also
concerned about the status of the American representatives in France and whether or not
they held such a distinction.285
In his discussions with Gerard, Laurens learned the answer to a question that had
perplexed him since his first months in Congress. When pressed about the disaffected
French officers who had applied to Congress for military commission and had been
rebuffed, Gerard said that he was aware of their complaints. However, realizing that not
every individual who had applied for such a commission was worthy, Gerard reported
that “Congress would never be troubled with petitions under his auspices.”286 This
answer settled a very pressing concern for Henry Laurens. Should Congress continue to
promote foreign notables over qualified American soldiers, a serious problem would
result. “Many of our American officers have abandoned their homes, all their domestic
happiness, the education of their children, the improvement of their fortunes,” Laurens
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wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette, “…and have the mortification of being commanded by
gentlemen who had held Lieutenancies in their native country, and who were promoted
here after one battle.”287
Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, French Minister Plenipotentiary, was officially
presented to the Continental Congress on August 6, 1778. After giving his official
greeting on behalf of the king of France, Gerard pledged that France would not cease in
its determination to end the war until the United States had been recognized by Great
Britain as an independent nation. “His majesty hath hastened to send you a powerful
assistance, which you owe only to his friendship,” Gerard announced, “to the sincere
regard he has for every thing which relates to the advantage of the United States…”288
After concluding his remarks, the minister was officially introduced to the Congress. In
his official welcome to the French representative, President Laurens commented that
“had it rested solely with the most Christian King, not only the independence of these
states would have been universally acknowledged, but their tranquility fully
established.”289 “The virtuous citizens of America,” he continued, “can never forget his
beneficent attention to their violated rights, nor cease to acknowledge the hand of a
gracious Providence in raising them up so powerful and illustrious a friend.”290
By the middle of July, a de facto state of war existed between France and Great
Britain. Laurens received news of this development from the American Commissioners
in France, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. With the naval assistance of the Count
d’Estaing, the costal areas of the United States were given protection from the British
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navy. However, Adams informed the president that the king of France had now ordered
his ships of war to begin attacking English vessel and had given his official assent to
privateers. The American Revolution had now entered a stage of total war between two
of the most powerful nations on earth. “War is not declared,” Adams wrote, “that is no
manifesto had been published…but each nation is daily manufacturing materials for the
other’s manifesto, by open hostilities.”291 Adams also warned the president not to heed
the peace overtures made by the British government as they were insulting to the national
dignity of the nation. Laurens agreed on this point and had given every indication of
resisting the attempts by the British peace commission to persuade Congress to accept
their peace proposals.292
The incident that further strengthened Laurens’ resolve concerned the repeated
attempts of the British peace commission to bribe members of Congress into supporting
their proposals. On July 9, 1778, Congress had requested its members to bring forward
“all letters received from any of the British peace commissioners or their agents, or from
any subject of the king of Great Britain of a public nature.” This was an attempt by the
majority of the members of Congress to determine just how far the peace commissioners
would go in their attempt to break down the resolve of the government. Laurens had
been opposed to this plan when originally considered in June of 1778, on the grounds that
a person’s private mail should not be considered by the eyes of the entire government. “I
could not forbear offering some objections,” he wrote to Washington, “it appeared to be a
dangerous attempt to stretch the powers of Congress.”293 However, as news was received
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of clandestine offers to members of Congress from representatives of the crown, his
resistance faded somewhat.
Though he still did not support the idea of an individual’s private correspondence
being submitted for public consumption, Laurens offered no resistance to the decision of
the Congress. He explained his change of opinion in a letter to General Washington
dated July 31, 1778. In this letter, the president charged the British peace commission
with sabotaging any attempt at negotiations, “having by various means, attempted to
bride Congress.” To Laurens, this information represented “the highest possible affront
to the representatives of a virtuous, independent people,” and further “rendered wholly
unworthy of the further regard of Congress in their ambassadorial character.”294 Laurens
referred to a letter sent to Pennsylvania Delegate Joseph Reed from George Johnstone, a
member of the British peace commission. This letter alluded to potential benefits for
Reed if he were to support the commission and advocate a peace settlement between
Great Britain and the United States.295 “I have for several days past,” Laurens explained,
“urged my friends to move Congress for a resolve that will hold no conference with such
men.”296
Laurens was concerned over the ramifications of such attempts to persuade
members of Congress. Not only could such a discovery undermine the usefulness of the
national assembly, but it could have diplomatic ramifications throughout Europe. “I am
commonly tenacious of my own ideas,” he wrote of his advocacy for the motion to break
off contact with the commission, “but in the present, as in the former case, I feel as if I

294
295
296

HL to George Washington, July 31, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 14: 99-100.
Joseph Reed to HL, June 15, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 13: 462-464.
HL to George Washington, July 31, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 14: 100.

92

clearly perceived many good effects which will be produced by a proper act on our
part.”297 Though the motion eventually failed to gain support in the Congress, the
attempts at bribery did not stop. When another delegate presented a similar letter to the
president, Laurens immediately went to Congress and demanded that they take a more
active stance.298
On August 11, 1778, Delegates Joseph Reed and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania
laid before the Congress the private letters sent to them by George Johnstone. The letters
were read publicly at the insistence of President Laurens and officially entered into the
congressional record.299 To Reed, Johnstone indicated that “the man who can be
instrumental in bringing us all to act once more in harmony,” would have the gratitude of
the king and the thanks of the people of Great Britain. He had made a similar offer to
Delegate Morris, offering him “honor and emolument” for guiding the Congress into
accepting the British reconciliation plan. While both of the delegates had indicated that
they were not swayed by such offers, they were obligated to present Johnstone’s letters to
the Congress. After serious debate, the Congress resolved to have no more contact with
George Johnstone respecting peace with Great Britain. While this resolution did not cut
off communication with the entire commission, it did single Johnstone out for his
attempted subversion of the Continental Congress. Laurens immediately sent a copy of
the resolution to the peace commission, now located in New York. The letter that
accompanied the resolution accused the commission of breach of faith and indicated that
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such actions would not be tolerated by the government of the United States.300
Throughout the remainder of his presidency, Laurens worked to solidify the
French alliance, although at times he became frustrated with the demands of Count
d’Estaing. Laurens also disagreed with the Marquis de Lafayette on the revitalization of
a military expedition into Canada, a proposal that both Laurens and Washington realized
would be futile. While their relationship did not suffer from this disagreement, Laurens
became wary of the demands of the French with respect to the United States. Thinking of
the future status of the nation among the powers of Europe, Laurens dedicated his energy
to resisting the continual reliance on foreign loans, as they would increase debt in the
United States. He was also concerned over the future of the United States once the war
with Britain had concluded. What type nation would exist in the aftermath of the war,
when American had relied on the assistance of powerful countries like France and Spain.
These were the major issues that the president contended with throughout the remainder
of his exhausting term as President of the Continental Congress.
While Laurens was the first member of Congress to rejoice at the signing of the
treaty of alliance, he realized that it was not a perfect document. He withheld his public
criticism of the treaty to foster an open and mutually beneficial relationship with France.
Laurens was concerned over the annexation of Florida by Spain as compensation for their
assistance in the war effort. While the treaty did not indicate that Spain would gain
control of Florida in exchange for its military assistance, it was a possibility that Laurens
had considered. “We have nothing new from Spain,” he wrote to New Jersey Governor
William Livingston, “gentlemen not only smiled, but laughed at my ideas expressed
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while we were reading the treaty with France, that the Spaniard had his eye upon the
Floridas…”301 After a conversation with Don Juan de Miralles, a Spanish observer living
in York who apprised the Spanish government on the political developments in America,
Laurens commented that he had “received strong confirmation of my suspicions.” While
dining with Don Juan, Laurens learned that Spain did have an interest in regaining
control of Florida as a means of achieving a foothold on trade with the southern states.
“This I really mean sir, as a secret,” Laurens wrote, “and if we keep it so, the discovery
may be applied to good purposes when we come to treat in earnest.” As always, Laurens
was thinking of the possible benefits of working out a settlement with Spain that would
be separate from any agreement that would come through France. “I am afraid our
present commissioners are not apprized,” Laurens concluded, “of the immense value to
our whole union of St. Augustine and Bahama, and that too many of us here, view the
possession in a light of partial benefit.”302
In late of August of 1778, the Marquis de Bretigney proposed an invasion into
British held territory of East Florida, which Laurens brought before the Congress. The
previous American expedition into the region in July of 1778 had been an abysmal
failure. Laurens described the situation as an “unhappy circumstance” which “will add to
the distress of Georgia, and increase her cries for relief.” The American forces had
previously been routed and taken severe losses against the British battalions in this effort
to free up the region from British control and relieve the embattled southern states.303
When the plan for an all out assault on the region was proposed by Bretigney, Laurens
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was somewhat skeptical as to its potential for success.
Congress agreed to employ a military expedition against the British in East
Florida under the command of Major General Benjamin Lincoln in November of 1778.304
This expedition was vital to the security of the southern states, particularly Georgia and
South Carolina. To gather the necessary personnel for this expedition, Congress allotted
land bounties for all those who joined the general until the area had been reduced and
occupied by American forces. Realizing the vital importance of this campaign, not only
to the safety of the southern states but to America’s bargaining power in the region,
Laurens advocated granting every soldier involved in the attack a portion of the land that
was seized. Originally, the Congress had intended only to allot these land bounties to the
commanding officers and their support staffs. However, Laurens knew that the citizen
soldier who had enlisted in the regiment was important, and needed proper motivation to
leave their homes and join Lincoln in Florida.305
While the command of the invasion force was bestowed on Lincoln, the
Continental Army was augmented by the militia units from Georgia, Maryland, Virginia,
and South Carolina. This required the cooperation of the various state executives, some
of whom were understandably concerned about the defense of their own states. To his
own home state, Laurens asked for immediate cooperation while at the same time
insisting that it was not the position of Congress to imply that the state leadership had no
control over their individual militias.306 Cooperation among the states was important to
the success of this mission. Congress continued to debate the issue of the attack on East

304
305
306

HL to Richard Caswell, November 14, 1778, Papers, Volume Fourteen. Chesnutt, 486-487.
JCC, Volume Twelve. Ford, 949-951.
South Carolina Delegates to Rawlins Lowndes, November 14, 1778, Papers. Chesnutt, 14: 489.

96

Florida through November of 1778 and into the first week of December, where it was
decided that such a proposal would be futile and result in great injury to the southern
states.307
At the same time the Congress worked out the particulars of an invasion into East
Florida, it was confronted with another ghost from its past. In September of 1778,
General Horatio Gates and General Jacob Bayley submitted a report to General
Washington outlining the potential for another military expedition into Canada.
Washington subsequently submitted this report to the Congress, which approved of it in
October of that same year. Congress ordered Laurens to write to Benjamin Franklin in
France and to consult with the French government on the validity of the plan. Although
at the time Laurens assumed that it was Lafayette who had revitalized the concept of an
invasion into Canada, the Marquis had only supported the idea. However, when
Congress ordered General Washington to begin outlining the supplies necessary for an
invasion into Canada, both were certain that the idea originated with Lafayette.308
This resulted in a series of misunderstandings regarding the expedition.
Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens informed the president that the Marquis de Lafayette
was desirous of introducing his plan for using French forces as a part of the Canadian
expedition. Lafayette had informed Washington that Canada could not be taken solely by
American forces, but would require a Frenchman at the head of the army to sway the
hearts of the people. John Laurens further warned his father that allowing the French to
have a foothold in Canada could cause problems for the United States in the future. John
Laurens worried about the potential manipulation of trade by the French, should they gain
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control of Canada.309 Washington privately confessed that France could use Canada as a
means to gain a foothold on valuable trade with Indian nations and monopolize the
fishing industry of Newfoundland. The president was also concerned over this
possibility.310
As Washington prepared his report for the Congress, Laurens began to seriously
reconsider the proposed attack. “I believe, and upon good ground,” he wrote, “the
scheme for an expedition into Canada in concert with the army of France originated in
the breast of Marquis de Lafayette…” While Laurens felt that this plan was created with
“the purest motives,” it was still a dangerous idea that was complicated “with eventual
mischiefs.”311 What greatly concerned the president regarding a joint operation with
France would be the financial straits it would put on the American government. Even if
France were to assume the greater responsibility in the campaign, the American
government would still need to rely on French loans. “I was one of the six unsuccessful
opponents to the resolution for borrowing money from France,” he added, “we have in
this single article plunged the union into a vast amount of debt.” Commenting on the
example this would set for the United States abroad, Laurens predicted “imminent danger
of dishonor and disgrace.”312 This represented a problem that Laurens had noticed from
his first weeks as a member of the Continental Congress. If America were to rely too
heavily on the assistance of foreign nations, it would soon place itself in a position where
it would not be able to subsist alone. Furthermore, a dependence on foreign assistance
would undermine the very concept of American liberty. “Every million livres you
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borrow,” Laurens argued, “implies a pledge of your lands…” “If the prosecution of so
extensive a project is from the present state of our army and funds impracticable,” he
concluded, “…I trust the Marquis will be satisfied with such reasonings in apology for
our desisting from the pursuit of his favorite enterprise as our circumstances will
dictate.”313
In order to pay for this mission, Laurens predicted that the Congress would have
to raise $20 million in taxes for the coming year. “This heavy tax,” he confessed, “and
the prospect of increasing impositions will show our constituents the necessity of
consolidating our strength, as well as the impropriety and danger of new military
enterprises.”314 Laurens forwarded the Commander-in-Chief’s objections on the proposed
invasion to the Congress, where it was considered by the Board of War. Adding his own
objections on the grounds that such an endeavor would be costly and detrimental to the
security of the nation, Laurens advocated that Congress cancel the planned invasion.
After considerable debate, the second proposed invasion into Canada was cancelled by
Congress in January of 1779.315 Laurens wrote to Lafayette explaining the government’s
decision. “Although the emancipation of Canada is a very desirable object,” he assured
the Marquis, “…considering the exhausted state of their resources, and the derangement
of their finances, they conceive it very problematical whether they could make any solid
impression in that quarter.”316
With the abandonment of the extraneous invasion plans, Laurens was able to
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focus his attention on settling another past matter. “Mr. Deane is returned to Congress in
pursuance of an order in the last winter,” Laurens wrote to Rawlins Lowndes in July of
1778.317 The question over Silas Deane’s actions while serving as American
Commissioner to France was of great concern for many within the Congress, including
President Laurens. The state of affairs among the American representatives in France
was becoming bothersome to the government and Deane’s actions while in Paris had
caused a great stir during Laurens’ first months in Congress.318
Silas Deane had promised dozens of wealthy Frenchmen commissions in the
Continental Army in exchange for their financial support. As the numerous French
military figures crowded the halls of Congress in September of 1777, Laurens had noted
the dangers of allowing these men commissions in the army over native born citizens of
the states.319 Despite his recall, Deane did not actually return to the United States until
well after the treaty of alliance with France had been signed. Commanded by Congress
“to give, from his memory, a general account of his whole transactions in France,” Deane
began describing his transaction while in Paris on August 15, 1778. Regarding Deane’s
testimony, Laurens wrote “we know too much, and yet I almost fear we know nothing of
our affairs in Europe.”320
While Gerard, Franklin, and even the French Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier de
Vergennes, had all spoken highly of Deane, Laurens commented “I shall form no
conclusion until I learn much more than has hitherto come to my knowledge.”321 While
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there were some members of the Congress who had indeed formed their own conclusions
on Silas Deane’s action while in Paris, Henry Laurens endeavored to reserve his
judgment--at least publicly. It was clear from his writings in November of 1777, that
Laurens did not approve of Deane’s methods. However, when Deane published an
account of the supposed disputes among the commissioners in Paris in the December 5th
issue of The Pennsylvania Packet, his detractors in Congress became incensed.
Addressing the “free and virtuous citizens of America,” Deane attempted to take his case
to the people.322 The result would forever sully Deane’s reputation among the members
of the Continental Congress and be the root cause of Henry Laurens’ resignation as its
president.
Referring to Deane’s letter as an “unnecessary appeal,” Laurens sought to address
the matter within the Congress. Deane’s letter had “created anxieties in the minds of the
good people of this city,” and contained accusations “highly derogatory to the honor and
interests of these United States.” Laurens, seeing Deane’s statements as “dishonorable,”
urged the Congress to appoint a committee to review and critique his comments
regarding the other commissioners in France and the defamatory statements made
regarding the Continental Congress. Before the vote could be taken, a motion was made
to adjourn Congress. Despite the president’s objection, the house adjourned.323 Laurens
took this action to be a sign of the divisions within the Congress. Though he had
witnessed such conflicts between his colleagues before, they had never prevented his
attempts to settle a matter. Insulted, Laurens sent out a hasty letter to General
Washington that alluded to his next course of action. “You will be pleased sir,” he wrote,
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“to direct your next dispatches to the President of Congress, who will not be the
subscriber.” Laurens promised the general that he would continue to assist him “in my
private character,” as best he could.324
The records of the Continental Congress for December 9, 1778 indicate that
before any business could be transacted, the president rose from his the chair and, after a
brief address outlining his reasons, resigned his responsibilities. After serving the
national assembly for over a year, Laurens returned to his seat as a delegate from South
Carolina and allowed Congress to appoint someone else to contend with the tumultuous
dictates of the national government.325 All evidence indicates that Henry Laurens took
this action over a point of honor concerning Silas Deane’s actions regarding the
American delegation to France. There is no indication in the records of the Continental
Congress that Laurens was asked to resign. Nor is there a record of an attempt to remove
him from his position. He simply resigned. Aside from being exhausted at having served
as president for slightly over a year, Laurens was offended by the quick dismissal of his
objections over Silas Deane’s actions. For Laurens, it was a matter of personal honor. At
this time in the United States, the concept of honor was held in the highest regard. Any
infringement on a man’s honor was a source of tension.326
On December 10, 1778, John Jay of New York was elected to fill the void created
by Laurens’ resignation.327 While Laurens’ service as president was now over, he would
not so quickly give up his national responsibilities. Rather, Laurens remained an active
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member of the Continental Congress and continued to have a positive effect on the course
of the American Revolution.
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Chapter Five: A Life in Service

Although Henry Laurens had been elected to another term as president of the
Continental Congress in November of 1778, his anguish over the factions within
Congress during the deposition of Silas Deane had compelled him to leave office barely
one month later. Nonetheless, Laurens decided to remain in Congress as a representative
of South Carolina. “I had never any ambition to sit in the chair of Congress,” he
explained to Samuel Huntingdon in December of 1778, “and when I had sat one complete
year in it, I urged the house to make a better choice for filling it.” Laurens commented
that it was “the unanimous voice then present requesting me to continue added to another
circumstance overbalanced my determination to retire.” Holding his position and the
status of Congress to be sacred in the affairs of the nation, Laurens explained that were he
to continue as president amid the public statements made by Silas Deane he would be
guilty of dishonoring the spirit of the position and the dignity of the national government
itself. Deane had exposed the internal disputes between the American commissioners in
Paris in widely published letter in December of 1778. This had caused another internal
dispute within the government. Laurens’ sense of honor regarding the factions within
Congress compelled him to step aside rather than become embroiled in yet another
partisan conflict that could destabilize the national government. Laurens felt that should
Congress focus on national affairs and avoid internal disputes between its membership.328
Despite the circumstances that had brought about his resignation as president,
Laurens was appointed by his colleagues to the Committee of Commerce on December
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14, 1778. The following week he was elected to chair that committee.329 It was during
his service in this capacity that Laurens was able to convince the Congress to abandon the
proposed Canada invasion on the grounds that there simply was not enough money for
such an adventure. No longer bound to mediate the debates of the government, Laurens
publicly stated his opinion on the issue and urged the assembly to drop the plan. His
separation from the chair allowed him to express his view more forcefully than before.330
Throughout his next year in Congress, Laurens was appointed to committees on finance
and military relations. He continued to serve the interests of the United States well and
received the thanks of his colleagues numerous times with assignment to powerful
committee posts. The remaining years of his life were dedicated to public service and
continuing the growth of young nation.331
When the Congress finally agreed to compensate its presidents for their services,
Laurens was deeply honored. Having spent a great deal of his own money to maintain
lodging and provide a carriage for transportation, Laurens was grateful to be
compensated. This decision affected President Jay more than Laurens, due to the fact
that Congress also resolved to provide a suitable house and carriage for the current
president. Laurens and his predecessors were asked to submit an account of all their
expenses during their term of office. This resolution benefited the heirs of the late Peyton
Randolph, as well as John Hancock and Henry Laurens.332 “I entreat you,” he wrote to
President Jay on December 16, 1778, “to return my grateful acknowledgements to the
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house, expressed in the enclosed paper.”333
Privately, though, Laurens confessed that the Congress had not come to this
decisions easily. Those members of Congress who were offended by Laurens’
resignation had argued over the wording of his official letter of thanks. In the end, the
house unanimously resolved to thank Laurens for his services in the execution of public
business. To Rawlins Lowndes, the former president expressed a sense of relief at being
“released from the chair.” Now, “my attention shall be bent to the investigation of the
secret and commercial committee accounts…forsaking all thoughts of my private affairs
for some time longer.”334 This seemed to be a theme in Laurens’ private life, in that he
deferred attending to his own affairs to serve the nation.
When Congress began an open debate on the prospects for attaining a loan from
Holland, Laurens was at the forefront of the discussions. By this time, President Jay had
been appointed Minster to Spain to secure financial and military assistance from that
government. In yet another desperate bid for funds, Congress also resolved to appoint a
commissioner to the Netherlands whose express purpose would be to negotiate a loan for
the United States. On October 13, 1779, Laurens presented a letter from Lieutenant
Colonel Jacob Gerhard Dirik outlining the potential for obtaining a loan from Holland. A
committee, of which Laurens was a member, reviewed the letter and suggested that the
Congress appoint a proper individual to negotiate the loan. Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. had
forwarded Lieutenant Colonel Dirik’s letter to Henry Laurens and requested that he
present it to Congress. On several occasions, the Congress refused to consider the letter
on the basis that it did not contain important business. Laurens continued to advocate for
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its committal and finally placed the letter in the hands of President Samuel Huntingdon in
October of 1779.335
The resolution empowering the American commissioner called for a man who
possessed superior accounting skills and the ability to attain contacts in the mercantile
field. Having spent most of his life in the merchant trade, Henry Laurens was the perfect
man for the task. He was the first individual to have his name placed in nomination, and
when the vote was taken he was appointed to the position.336 On October 30,1779, a
special committee expanded Laurens’ mandate and empowered him to negotiate a “treaty
of amity and commerce with the United Provinces of the low countries.”337 On
November 1, 1779, he was appointed the first American Commissioner to the United
Provinces of the low countries. He was empowered to seek out a low interest loan and
establish a diplomatic relationship with the Dutch.338
Laurens left the city of Philadelphia on November 9, 1779 and immediately set
out for South Carolina.339 Arriving in Charles Town on December 10, 1779, Laurens was
perplexed to find that none of his instructions from the Congress had arrived. He had no
written mandate from the American government to pursue a loan, nor did he possess the
treaty that had been written by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Lacking a proper staff,
and even an assistant, Laurens wrote to President Samuel Huntingdon. “I have not been
furnished with the act for my appointment,” he commented, “for the appointment of a
secretary, with commission and instructions for negotiating a treaty of commerce with the
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United States of the Netherlands…nor has the opportunity offered for my sailing to
Europe.”340 Those ships that were available at Charles Town harbor were bound for
France and could not transport the frustrated commissioner to his destination. Laurens
was forced to seek his own method of transportation to the Netherlands.341
Even though the proper instruction outlining his diplomatic mission had failed
to arrive in South Carolina, Laurens began to keep an account of his mission. The
financial and personal records of this journey from Philadelphia to South Carolina are an
accurate portrayal of what occurred during his voyage to the Netherlands. Even before
he left the United States, Laurens had spent over $13,315 transporting his belongings,
personal papers, and shipping a supply of leather that he purchased in South Carolina for
the board of war.342 In the time between his request for orders from the Continental
Congress and his departure for the Netherlands, Laurens was able to return to the realm
of regional politics, being elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in
January of 1780. It was during this service that Henry Laurens introduced a progressive
proposal that had been advocated by John Laurens, when Henry Laurens was president of
Congress.
Though he only served in the House of Representatives for two full days, Laurens
was able to introduce a bill that provided for the enlistment of free blacks in the South
Carolina militia. After the proposal was rewritten, a committee of the house agreed that
free blacks would be a necessary addition for the South Carolina militia. The house
approved of the plan and further ordered that commissioners be appointed to enlist 1,000
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freed blacks as a source of labor to assist with the defense of the state. Though they
would not be directly involved in the fighting, these laborers were to receive
compensation for their efforts.343 This proposal represented a serious ideological victory
for John Laurens, who had encouraged his father to support a similar proposal during his
presidency. Beginning in 1778, John Laurens had requested that the then President
Laurens propose the enlistment of a regiment of black soldiers in the Continental
Army.344 Though the elder Laurens did not wish to discourage his son, he realized that
such a bold plan would meet with heavy resistance among the members of Congress. He
further argued that to conscript a regiment of slaves and free blacks into a military unit
was no better than slavery itself.345 He changed his mind after repeated entreaties from
John Laurens, when Henry finally saw the opportunity to advance this idea.
When a British fleet arrived off the coast of South Carolina in February of 1780,
Laurens informed the Committee on Foreign Affairs that he would set out on his own to
North Carolina to attain passage on a ship bound for Europe. “In the meantime,” he
added, “I shall omit no opportunity of acquainting you with my circumstances.”346 This
was a reference to the lack of communication from the Congress regarding his mission.
Once more, Laurens was about to embark on a journey that would be, at least for him,
part improvisation.
In April of 1780, Laurens went to Wilmington, North Carolina to board a
European-bound vessel, but found it difficult to obtain passage. Every available ship was
being used to either supply the states or fight off the British. The French vessels were
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constantly engaged in maneuvers against the British, which delayed Laurens’ diplomatic
mission.347
As Charles Town was bombarded by British warships, Laurens learned that the
South Carolina government was in flight to Camden. When the city surrendered on May
12, 1780, over 2,600 American prisoners were taken by the British, including Lieutenant
Colonel John Laurens. “Upon my honor,” Laurens wrote to the South Carolina
delegation in Congress, “I have not shed one tear, from any consideration respecting my
son or myself.” “Let not this damping picture incline us to despondency,” he continued,
“but, impel us to act with more wisdom, more vigor for the relief of our unhappy fellow
citizens, the recovery of our country, and the establishment of our independence.”348 As
he received reports from Charles Town outlining the devastation brought to the city by
the American surrender, Laurens became more aware of the importance of attaining a
loan from the Dutch. A letter from John Laurens, now in captivity, reiterated this
concern and fell heavily upon the elder Laurens.349
In July of 1780, Laurens finally received the official sanction of the Continental
Congress to proceed on his mission to the Netherlands. Having personally returned to
Philadelphia to determine what had held the official response from the Congress for so
long, Laurens began his journey to the Netherlands in August of 1780 aboard the
Mercury.350 His personal journal, kept throughout the next two years, contains detailed
notes on the voyage.
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In his trunk, Henry Laurens carried an “unauthenticated” copy of the proposed
treaty between the United Provinces and the United States of America. Angered at the
fact that Congress had not given him the authentic treaty to be signed, Laurens “threw it
into a trunk” containing documents that he intended to go over at a later date.351 On
September 3, 1780, the Mercury was stopped by the British frigate Vestal under the
command of Captain George Keppel. “Captain Keppel received me on board in a stile
humane and polite,” Laurens wrote, “I presented my sword and purse to him, he desired
me to keep both.” Henry Laurens was now prisoner of the British.352
In his journal, Laurens details his efforts to dispose of the treaty and his personal
papers so they would not fall into the hands of his captors. The documents were safely
deposited in a “long bag” and thrown overboard by Laurens’ secretary, Major Moses
Young. While the bag was heavy enough to sink, an air pocket inside it prevented this
from occurring. A sailor on the Vestal pulled the bag from the sea and the treaty was
recovered. Laurens commented that Captain Keppel performed his duties well and was
worthy of praise for the respectful way he treated his prisoner. “I shall now be sent to
England,” Laurens wrote, “where I shall be of more real service to my own country than I
could possibly be in any other part of Europe.” Despite the fact that his diplomatic
mission to the Netherlands was, under his present circumstances, a total failure, Lauren
maintained a positive attitude.353
Transferred to the British vessel Fairy, Laurens arrived in England on September
19, 1780. Placed under the guard of a young Lieutenant named Norris, Laurens was
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taken to London. When Lieutenant Norris was visiting friends in Exeter for several days,
Laurens had the opportunity to escape his captor and disappear into the English
countryside. He chose to remain and face the ordeal that was coming to him. “I feel no
inclination to escape,” he replied to William Knox, undersecretary of state for the
American colonies, who actually encouraged Laurens to slip away while the Lieutenant
was remiss in his duties.354 Arriving in London on October 6, 1780, Laurens was escorted
under heavy guard to White Hall to meet with members of the king’s privy council.
After his interview, Laurens was confined to the Tower of London on the charge of
suspicion of high treason against the crown.355 Locked up at night, and under the custody
of two guards, Henry Laurens was denied the right to write or receive correspondence.
When a bystander commented on the unfortunate situation that Laurens was reduced to
and that it was likely that he would die in the tower, Laurens responded, “I shall not leave
a bone with you.”356
Henry Laurens spent fifteen months as a prisoner in the Tower of London. In that
time he was subjected to several attacks of gout and suffered from numerous health
ailments.357 When asked by an old friend named Oswald to apologize to the British
government for his actions during the revolution, Laurens responded “I will never
subscribe to my own infamy and to the dishonor of my children.” Even though Oswald
had assured Laurens that he would be pardoned for his crimes against the crown if he
could offer some sign of contrition, Laurens refused to assent. In his mind, he had
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nothing to be sorry for.358
Throughout every interview with members of the privy council and
representatives from the British government, Laurens refused to denounce the American
cause. On December 31, 1781, Laurens was transported to Searjant’s Inn for a hearing
on his possible release from the tower. When asked to swear an oath on “our sovereign
Lord, the King,” Laurens exclaimed “not my sovereign!”359 By this time, General
Charles Cornwallis, second in command of the British army in North America, had
surrendered to the Continental Army at Yorktown.360 The fighting was over, the United
States and their allies had won the war for independence.
Laurens was released from the Tower of London in January of 1781, officially
exchanged for Lord Cornwallis. After recuperating in Bath, England, Laurens was
informed that Congress had appointed him as one of America’s commissioners to the
peace conference in Paris. After over a year as a prisoner of the British, Laurens was
now empowered to settle the terms of their surrender and attain official recognition of
American independence.361 Though uncertain of the legality of his status, Laurens met
with John Adams in Holland on April 14, 1782 to discuss the conditions for negotiating
with Great Britain. Both men agreed that no negotiations would take place unless
America was recognized by Great Britain as a sovereign nation.362 Back in England,
Laurens worked to impress this upon the earl of Shelburne, who was a member of Prime
Minister Rockingham’s cabinet. In a private meeting with the earl, Laurens insisted that
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the United States be recognized as an independent nation and that their rights be secured
for the future.363
Devastating news and personal hardship seem to be integral factors in the life of
Henry Laurens. On August 27, 1782, Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens was killed
fighting a contingent of British troops at Chehaw Neck, South Carolina.364 While resting
at Bath, Laurens received news of his son’s death through John Adams. “I feel for you,
more than I can or ought express,” Adams wrote, “our country has lost its most promising
character.”365 Aware of the fact that America was in need of his voice, Laurens
responded to Adams that he would comply with the wishes of Congress and attend the
peace conference. “Thank God,” he concluded, “I had a son who dared die in defense of
his country.” His emotional wound was deep, the deepest he had felt in many years, but
Laurens was dedicated to the cause of independence. With the end of the war now
assured and the looming prospect of peace, he could not delay his departure any longer.366
Once more, his private affairs would have to wait.
Frustrated at the fact that no official settlement of the war between the United
States and Great Britain had yet to be reached, Laurens set out for Paris in December of
1782. He had spent the last year working with the British government in London to try
and reach a settlement that immediately recognized the sovereign status of the United
States. Knowing the ministers at While Hall would communicate their terms with the
British representatives in Paris, Laurens felt his advocacy would make a considerable
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difference. In this capacity he acted as a point of contact for the American
representatives. He used his time in London to serve as the rear guard for the American
negotiations in Paris.367
When the preliminary articles of peace were accepted by all parties in December
of 1782, Laurens apprised the South Carolina delegation in Congress of the state of
affairs. “The treaty,” Laurens wrote to John Lewis Gervais, “…will give general
satisfaction on our side of the water and prove to be the ground work for our future
happiness.”368 Despite a few quarrels among the peace delegates over compensation for
property losses, the definitive peace treaty concluding the American Revolution was
signed on September 3, 1783.369
When he returned to Philadelphia from Europe in the summer of 1784, Laurens
reported directly to the Continental Congress. After giving his report, Laurens began the
long trip to his home in South Carolina. After serving the nation since 1777, Laurens
now looked forward to a life of quiet retirement in the presence of his family and
friends.370 Though he would endeavor to avoid holding political office throughout the
remainder of his life, Henry Laurens remained active in the public world of American
political thought. The citizens of South Carolina expressed their gratitude to Henry
Laurens by naming one of the state’s seven new judicial districts after him. He was once
more elected to the state legislature in 1785, but declined to serve due to personal
reasons. When urged to seek the office of Governor of South Carolina, he also refused.
“I am now what I had not been for thirty proceeding years…” he commented on his
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return to civilian life, “…‘tis happy for us when we know where to stop.”371
Laurens was ready to stop and settle down for the first time since the late 1750s,
when he had entered public service. His financial affairs were in a state of near ruin as a
result of the war for independence and his absence from Mepkin. His plantations in
Georgia had been seized by the British and put up for public auction in late 1787.
Although this was not a phenomenon totally unique to Henry Laurens, the effect that this
financial ruin had on his personal well being was just as draining as his presidential
services ten years earlier.372
Throughout the next five years, Laurens remained a well respected public figure
in South Carolina. Having experienced the inherent flaws of the Articles of
Confederation, Laurens became the proponent of a stronger union of the states. Though
he had been elected as one of South Carolina’s delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, Laurens reported that he was “incapable of any arduous business.”
While he was honored to once more be chosen by his peers to represent the interests of
his state, he maintained that it would not possible for him to travel to Philadelphia.373
Though he could not join his colleagues in Philadelphia, Laurens nevertheless expressed
his opinions to those who updated him on the progress of the convention. Philadelphia
merchant William Bell was Laurens’ source of information during the debates. While
Bell was not a member of the Constitutional Convention, he was an observer of the
situation and the conduct through which Henry Laurens was able to publicly express his
feelings on the proposed Constitution.
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In a series of letters to Bell, Laurens voiced his concerns over the powers of the
office of President of the United States. “I have one capital objection,” he wrote in
October of 1787, “they have given the intended President no coercive power in the
passing of laws.” Laurens further argued that if the convention were going to create such
an office, “they should either have given him power, or entirely have omitted his name on
that subject.”374 Bell published the letter in the next issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette
without Laurens‘ knowledge. The letter was subsequently reprinted in several other midAtlantic news papers throughout October and November of 1787. The subsequent
articles credited Laurens with advocating the adoption of the proposed Constitution,
provided that the convention amend its guidelines for the powers of the President. Not
wishing to overtly influence the delegates who were attending the convention, Laurens
responded to Bell’s actions. “…I acknowledge the system is an “improvement,” upon the
present confederation,” Laurens wrote, “…in a work of such vast importance, ’tis our
duty to proceed with cautious and wise deliberation.”375
Laurens did get the opportunity to express his opinion on the final Constitution
once it had been accepted by the convention in Philadelphia. Elected as a delegate to
South Carolina’s ratification convention, Laurens returned to Charles Town in April of
1788. The South Carolina ratification convention met from April 17 until May 28, 1788.
When the vote was totaled, the new Constitution of the United States was approved by a
vote of 149 to 73. Henry Laurens apparently approved of the revisions made by the
delegates in Philadelphia and voted in favor of the new document.376
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When George Washington was a candidate for President of the United States, in
the first election for that office, Henry Laurens was one of the electors from the state of
South Carolina.377 Having expressed his displeasure at the inherent weakness of the
presidency in the early drafts of the Constitution, Laurens was now satisfied that the new
system would provide the firm leadership that the nation required. Having experienced
the limited authority of being President of Congress, Laurens recognized how much more
effective a federal government would.
Retiring once more to Mepkin, Laurens surrounded himself with his children and
their families. On December 8, 1792, the man who never sought political distinction yet
had found his life closely connected with the fortunes of the young American nation died
at the age of 68.378 In accordance with his will, Laurens was cremated.379
History has underestimated the effect that Henry Laurens had on the course of the
American Revolution and the success of the fragile young republic during its most
tumultuous experience. His interest in American rights was not confined to the sphere of
his home in South Carolina. When called to national service, he embraced his
responsibility with stern determination despite any personal misgivings that he had
entertained. Laurens grew from a proponent of reconciliation into America’s fiercest
advocate. His gradual evolution from reconciliation into sovereignty was the direct result
of his term as President of the Continental Congress. With each crisis he encountered,
Laurens became more determined to lead America through the stormy seas of revolution.
For slightly over one year, Henry Laurens was the political head of a developing
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nation. There were no set criterion on how the President of Congress was supposed to act
or what powers he possessed. Like his predecessors, Laurens had to improvise his role.
Rather than taking the perspective of an observer, he became an active participant in the
functions of the American government and used his position to put forward those ideas
and political concepts that he felt were most essential to the success of the revolution. At
times, Laurens simply underscored the congressional resolutions that he thought were
most important. During more perplexing issues, he would take bold steps to find a
solution. His correspondence is the single greatest body of evidence to support this
conclusion.
As his fellow delegates became distracted from their public duties and abandoned
the Congress, Laurens was left with responsibility of moderating a waning government.
Calling the remaining delegates into extra sessions, Laurens began a public
correspondence that urged the individual states to replenish their congressional
delegations. The orders had come from Congress, but the sentiments were his own. At a
time when the nation was in need of dedicated leaders, Laurens came to the forefront and
through his encouragement was able to hold the legislature together.
When a dispute between George Washington and General Thomas Conway
threatened the stability of the Continental Army, Laurens was faced with a potentially
dangerous political conflict. The Conway-Washington dispute represented a very real
threat to the continuance of the American cause. Furthermore, any conspiracy to
undermine the authority of General Washington was also a direct threat to the French
alliance. Receiving information from his son, Laurens endeavored to prevent knowledge
of this dispute from reaching the public. He also worked to calm the tensions between
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the two generals before others had the opportunity to take sides. When all the facts had
been presented, Laurens determined that General Conway was the root cause of the
internal conflict. Laurens publicly supported General Washington and curtailed any
potential movements to undermine his command of the Continental Army.
Moreover, Washington’s friendship with the Marquis de Lafayette presented a
potentially damaging diplomatic quagmire. Angered at the insubordinate attitude of
General Conway, Lafayette demanded that the government take decisive disciplinary
action on the matter. Laurens feared that Lafayette would withdraw his support of the
revolution if the American government did not support the Commander-in-Chief. Were
Lafayette to resign his commission in the army and return to France, the financial and
military support needed by the Americans would evaporate. Fortunately, Laurens was
able to maintain a firm grip on the conspiracies that perplexed the American military
during the winter of 1777-1778. The French alliance was maintained, and Lafayette
gained a greater respect for Laurens, thanks to his public support of Washington amid the
criticism of his subalterns.
Diplomacy was at the center of Laurens national service. His term as president
was an effort to reach out to the essential players in the American Revolution. When the
states faltered in their representations, Laurens evoked the revolutionary spirit of the
individual state governments and encouraged them to take a more active stance in the
affairs of the national government. It wasn’t just their own state that they were fighting
for, it was the liberty of a new nation.
To prevent the dissolution of the military, Laurens urged an atmosphere of
cooperation between the state militia leaders and the regional commanders of the
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Continental Army. To maintain the military and commercial alliance with the French,
Laurens urged the government to ignore any attempts by the British to generate a rift
between America and France. He further argued that there could be no discussion about
the end of hostilities without England’s public acknowledgement of the sovereign status
of the United States. His dealings with the Carlisle peace commission represent his
determination to see the thirteen colonies recognized as free and independent states.
Throughout his public interaction with representatives of the British government, the man
who had once espoused reconciliation with Great Britain came out as America’s most
fervent advocate.
Henry Laurens maintained the delicate balance between the interests of the
individual states and the nation as a whole throughout his presidency. In his public
service he was both a diplomat and a crisis manager. His service to the American
Revolution cannot be overlooked. Without his determination and tireless efforts, the
revolution would have descended into chaos. Without his sometimes genuflecting
relationship with the French, the United States would have lost its strongest ally in its
quest for independence. Laurens took on the burden of leadership in a position that
contained no definition of authority. The concept of a chief executive was alien to the
United States that Henry Laurens served. However, necessity demanded a firm leader in
the midst of the winter of 1777-1778, and Henry Laurens fulfilled that demand
admirably.
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